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 1 
Summary 
This thesis discusses the European Parliament’s role in the procedure for 
concluding a withdrawal agreement under Article 50 TEU. The theoretical 
base for the discussions is multi-level governance. Through the Multi-level 
governance perspective, the European Parliament can be seen as an 
independent actor from the Member States that might want to influence the 
negotiations and content of the withdrawal agreement. According to Article 
50(3) TEU the European Parliament must give its consent to any withdrawal 
agreement. The European Parliament could use this form of veto-power to 
influence the negotiation process from start to finish, and force the other 
Unions institutions and the United Kingdom to listen to its demands. This 
would be consistent with how the European Parliament has acted under 
previous negotiations of international agreements. This thesis also shows that 
the general procedure for concluding international agreements in 218 TFEU 
probably also applies on the procedure for concluding the withdrawal 
agreement. That the general procedure applies would mean, among other 
things, that the European Parliament could argue for access to information on 
the progress of the negotiations of a withdrawal agreement.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats behandlar Europaparlamentets roll i förhandlingarna om ett 
utträdesavtal enligt artikel 50 FEU. Det teoretiska perspektivet är multi-level 
governance genom vilket Europaparlamentet ses som, från medlemsstaterna 
oberoende aktör som kan ha intresse av att påverka förhandlingarna och 
utträdesavtalet. Europaparlamentet måste enligt Artikel 50(3) FEU ge sitt 
godkännande till utträdesavtalet. Uppsatsen visar att, på samma sätt som 
Europaparlamentet gjort under tidigare förhandlingar, kan Europaparlamentet 
använda denna veto-makt till att påverka hela förhandlingsprocessen. Detta 
ger Europaparlamentet möjligheten att pressa de övriga institutionerna och 
Storbritannien att ta hänsyn till dess krav. Uppsatsen visar också att den 
generella proceduren för att sluta internationella avtal i 218 FEUF med stor 
sannolikhet också är tillämpligt på proceduren för att sluta ett utträdesavtal. 
Genom den generella proceduren för att sluta avtal antagligen är tillämplig på 
proceduren för att sluta utträdesavtalet så ökar blandat annat 
Europaparlamentets möjlighet till tillgång till information om 
förhandlingarnas utveckling.  
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Preface 
Nu får det räcka. Jag tackar Mamma, Pappa, Maria och Farmor för allt stöd 
genom åren.  
 
Ett särskilt stort tack till Sara! 
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Abbreviations 
ACTA                              Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
 
AG                     Advocate General  
 
CCP                                  Common Commercial Policy 
 
CFSP                                Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
CJEU                                Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
EC                                     European Council  
 
ECHR                               European Convention on Human Rights 
 
GAC                                 General Affairs Council 
 
IGC                                   Intergovernmental Conference 
 
IIA                                     Inter Institutional Agreement 
 
SWIFT                              Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
                                          Telecommunications 
 
TEU                                  Treaty on European Union  
  
TFEU                                Treaty on The Functioning of the European Union 
 
TFTP                                 The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program                                
 
UK                                    The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland                  
 
US                                     The United States of America                                      
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1 Introduction  
This introductory chapter gives a background, explaining the relevance of the 
European Parliament’s (henceforth the Parliament) involvement in the 
withdrawal procedure under Article 50 TEU1. The purpose of this thesis and 
its research question is presented followed by a discussion on theory and 
method used in this thesis. The sources of this thesis, disposition and 
delimitations are thereafter discussed.  
1.1 Background 
The background to the wide sudden interest of Article 50 TEU, the provision 
on withdrawal from the Union, is well known. The results of the British 
referendum on membership of the European Union (henceforth the Union) on 
the 23rd of June 2016 put the procedure for a Member State leaving Union in 
the spotlight. Since the referendum, the brief and the, arguable, ambiguous 
formulation of Article 50 TEU has been much discussed. The provision, 
which was introduced through the Lisbon Treaty, has never been used before 
and if the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (henceforth 
the UK) ultimately leaves the Union it will be the first time in the Union 
history a Member State leaves the Union. The example of Greenland’s 
departure from the Union cannot be taken as precedent. Greenland was not a 
Member State; but a territory belonging to a Member State and therefore the 
characteristics of the process is fundamentally different.2 Thus, there is a lot 
of uncertainty concerning the withdrawal process. There is a lively debate on 
what the future relations will and should be like between the Union and the 
UK. This thesis deals however with the process of withdrawal and not any 
possible legal arrangement for future relations. This thesis’s main focus is 
instead on the procedure for concluding the withdrawal agreement, according 
to Article 50 TEU, and in particular the Parliament’s role in the withdrawal 
process. 
 
The Parliament’s role in the procedure for concluding the withdrawal 
agreement is one of the issues that have not yet received a lot of attention in 
the legal commentary of Article 50 TEU. It is, therefore, interesting to look 
more closely at the Parliament’s role in the withdrawal procedure. Leading 
Members of Parliament have also made known that they will not be follow 
the negotiations passively and will not accept any deal being made.3  
                                                 
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C202/16 (henceforth 
TEU). 
2 E Poptcheva, 'Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a Member States from the EU' (European 
Parliamentary Research Service February 2106), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_BRI(2016)5779
71_EN.pdf Accessed on the 23 May 2107, 3.  
3 M De La Baume, ' European Parliament to play 'bad cop' in Brexit Talks' Politico 
(Brussels, 28 March 2017) http://www.politico.eu/Article/european-parliament-to-play-bad-
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Members of the current British cabinet have however indicated, that they only 
see a marginal role for the European Parliament in the withdrawal process.4  
Consequently, it is in that context interesting to investigate from a legal 
perspective, the Parliaments possibilities to influence the process of 
negotiating the withdrawal agreement.    
 
It is also interesting to look at the Parliament’s involvement in the process of 
negotiating the withdrawal agreement negotiations from the perspective of its 
functions as an assembly of elected representatives. A prominently discussed 
theme from the Brexit-campaign leading up to the Brexit referendum was that 
the British people needed to take back control from the Brussels’ bureaucrats 
and that the Union Membership eroded the British democracy.5  Regardless 
whether or not the claims that the decision-making at the Union level is not 
sufficiently democratic are valid; the proclaimed democratic deficit of the 
Union has for a long time been debated. One of the major approaches to 
increase the Union’s democratic legitimacy has been to increase the 
Parliament’s powers in the decision-making. The idea being, that increasing 
the feature of representative democracy would provide the Union with more 
democratic legitimacy.6 With this background, it is interesting to investigate 
the European Parliament’s involvement in the procedure for negotiating a 
withdrawal agreement. Which possibilities do the representatives, elected by 
the people of the Union, have to influence the agreement with a withdrawing 
Member State?  
 
1.2 Purpose and research question 
According to Article 50(2) TEU the Council can only conclude an agreement 
with a leaving Member State setting out the arrangement for an orderly 
withdrawal7 after obtaining the consent of the Parliament. The Parliament’s 
involvement is therefore fundamental for the conclusion of such an 
agreement. Hence, the Parliament has a role to play in the process of 
negotiating a withdrawal agreement. This thesis purpose is to evaluate this 
role; how and in which ways the Parliament could influence the negotiations 
of a withdrawal agreement with a leaving Member State.  
 
                                                 
cop-in-brexit-talks/?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=b42e28d377-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_03_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-
b42e28d377-190014845 accessed on 18 May 2017.   
4 General elections are scheduled to be held in the UK on 8th of June 2017: C Cooper,  
'David Davis: The Guy Verhofstad won´t make Brexit decisions' Politico (Brussels, 26 
January 2017) http://www.politico.eu/Article/david-davis-guy-verhofstadt-wont-make-
brexit-decisions/ accessed on 18 May 2017.  
5 M Hall 'Boris Johnson urges Brits to vote Brexit to ‘take Back Control”' Express (London, 
20 June 2016) http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/681706/Boris-Johnson-vote-Brexit-
take-back-control accessed on 18 May 2017.  
6 P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2015) 56-57, 
151-152. 
7 Henceforth referred to as the withdrawal agreement.  
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To achieve the purpose of this thesis, I will answer the following research 
question: 
 
What is the European Parliament’s role in the negotiations for a withdrawal 
agreement according to Article 50 TEU?   
 
1.3 Theory 
Defining or categorising the Union as an institution is not an easy task. How 
to understand the European integration is far from undisputed and there are 
different theories of how the integration started, what drives it, and how to 
explain it. When discussing the role of a Union institution, like the 
Parliament, it is, therefore, important to be explicit with which view of the 
European integration the analysis is based on. This subchapter gives a short 
overview of the debate of what causes and which actors drive the European 
Integration. After the overview, the theory used in this thesis, multi-level 
governance, is described. The theory of multi-level governance is also shortly 
discussed concerning the development of the Parliament’s increasing 
legislative powers. In the last part of this subchapter, I develop on how the 
multi-level governance perspective is used as a theoretical base in this thesis.  
 
1.3.1 Intergovernmentalism vs. 
Supranationalism 
There is an ongoing debate among scholars whether the control over the 
European integration is exclusively in the hands of the Member States or if 
the integration is caused by other factors and is in fact out of the Member 
States’ hands. The debate is, put simply, taking place between proponents on 
one side of the spectrum, intergovernmental theories, and on the others side 
proponents of supranational theories.8   
 
The earliest supranational theory on European integration was the Neo-
functionalist theory.9 The central part of the classic version of neo-
functionalism was the concept of the spillover effect. The concept means that 
integration in one sector leads to further integration also in other sectors. The 
integration in one area spills over into other areas. The underlining idea with 
the spillover effect is that several sectors are so interdependent and that 
integration in one sector inevitable would affect these other sectors. The 
integration in one sector often only works if other sectors are also integrated. 
                                                 
8 S George, 'Multi-level Governance and the European Union' in I Bache and M Flinders 
(ed), Multi-level Governance (Oxford University Press 2004) 108-111. 
9 The groundbreaking book on neo-functionalism by Ernst B. Haas was published in 1958: 
The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford 
University Press).  
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10 One example is that the removal of tariffs leads to a need to remove other 
kinds of trade barriers that hinder the free trade on the single market. The 
integration process would in this fashion progress without direct control of 
the Member States. Political spill-over effects are also to be expected, in those 
areas where a certain degree of integration has been reached, and pressure 
from interest groups builds up to remove other barriers to trade.11 The neo-
functionalist theory consequently has a pluralist view on integration, meaning 
that states are not the only relevant actors but instead that regional integration 
is driven by a number of different actors. These are not only active in the 
domestic arena but also interact with other actors on the European level, for 
example forming alliances.12 This pressure is directed towards the Member 
states, the European Community and those with regulatory power. For the 
integration and spill-over effects momentum, the early neo-functionalist 
believed the national elites would have a crucial role. The national elites must 
come to the perception that problems must be lifted to the inter-state level due 
to the importance of integration in sectors that are interdependent. This 
pressure will then result in further integration. Neo-functionalists regard the 
Commission as a key-player for the, somewhat elitist project, of enhancing 
the European integration. The neo-functionalist theory received criticism and 
lost support during the sixties and onwards because of the stagnation of the 
European integration. The theory was also challenged on theoretical, not only 
empirical grounds, for its difficulties in explaining the political realities.13 
During the first half of the 1990s, with the renewed momentum of European 
integration, the interest in neo-functionalism rose again.14 Influential 
contribution to the revival of neo-functionalism has come from Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz abandoned the concept of the spill-
over effect and instead refer to a transaction-based theory. According to the 
transaction-based theory, a growing number of transactions, for example in 
travels and trade, results in demand for regulation at a European level. This, 
eventually, will lead to a institutionalization-process. The institutionalization-
process, will in, turn lead to the forming of supranational governance.15  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, the supporters of the intergovernmentalist 
theories object to the existence of the pluralist political system.16 The classic 
intergovernmentalism theory started out as a criticism against neo-
functionalism. Intergovernmentalism has connections to the realist and 
neorealist theories in the field of International Relations theory. 
Intergovernmentalism place a large amount of emphasis on the preferences of 
states and, in the case of the Union, the Member States. Member States 
actions are rational, and they evaluate their partaking in the Union from the 
                                                 
10 A Nieman and P C Schmitter, 'Neofunctionalism' in A Wiener and T Diez (ed), European 
Integration Theory (2th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 49.   
11 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 24. 
12 A Nieman and P C Schmitter (n 10) 47-49.   
13 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 24.  
14 C Strøby Jensen, 'Neo-functionalism' in M Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (ed), 
European Union Politics (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 55. 
15 Ibid. 61-62. 
16 S George (n 8) 109-110.  
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expected costs and benefits. This cost-benefit analysis is done to protect the 
national interests. The increase in trade between states creates incentives for 
coordination between states. The level of integration is decided by bargaining 
by the states and is carried out through strategic reasoning. These negotiations 
can be carried out through supranational institutions, like the Union, because 
it is more time and cost effective. The Union’s existence can, therefore, be 
explained by its Member States will of decision making in an efficient 
manner. 17The European integration is seen as a pooling of sovereignty, rather 
than transferring sovereignty to a supranational level. Because of its state-
centric view on the European integration, intergovernmentalists do not 
consider the Union’s institutions as independent actors but are, when it comes 
to critical issues, at the mercy of the Member States. The only institution that 
really matters is the European Council.18 The initial intergovernmentalist 
perspective was later developed into different versions of which Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism has been the most influential. The Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism theory, is the theory most other integration theories are 
compared too. The theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, which has been 
advanced by Andrew Moravcsik, considers the Union to be an 
intergovernmental regime whose task is to manage the economic 
interdependence. The Union’s decisions are made through interstate 
bargaining and are usually the result of the lowest common denominator 
among the Member States.19  
 
In this thesis, I view the integration in the European Union from a multi-level 
governance perspective. Some authors argue that the multi-level governance 
perspective should not be regarded as belonging exclusively to the 
intergovernmental perspective or the supranational perspective but instead be 
seen as the bridge between these two perspectives. Others, like George 
(2004), argue that the multi-level perspective clearly belongs to the 
supranational perspective.20 
 
1.3.2 Multi-level governance 
Multi-level governance was introduced in the 1990s and differed from the 
prevailing theories at that time which put great emphasis on the Member 
States’ actions. The proponents of the multi-level governance perspective 
argued instead that the integration process is driven by different agents, both 
private and public, at different levels of government. These levels are 
subnational, national and supranational. According to the multi-level 
governance perspective, the authority and power of the policy-making is not 
exclusively owned by the Member States, meaning that member states are not 
in absolute control.21 Multi-level governance’s inclusion of the regional level 
                                                 
17 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 25. 
18 M Cini, 'Intergovernmentalism' in M Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (ed), European 
Union Politics (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 69. 
19 S George (n 8) 109-110; M Cini (n 18) 73. 
20 S George (n 8) 108. 
21 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 25-26. 
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was a new feature, that distinguished multi-level governance from the earlier 
supranational theories. Instead of arguing that the Member States aggregate 
the national preferences, the multi-level governance views regional actors, 
like regions and municipalities, as independent actors that can develop 
relations with actors at the Union level. Regional actors can in that way 
influence EU-institutions, as the Parliament and the Commission, without the 
involvement of the Member States executives.22 The multi-level governance 
perspective argues that EU-institutions, including the European Parliament, 
cannot solely be considered as agents of the Member States’ national 
governments. The multi-level governance perspective differs from the 
theories of integration which claims that the Member States have a monopoly 
on influencing the decision and the policy making at the European Union 
level and therefore also controls the level of integration. The ability for 
member state as principals to control the EU institutions as agents are 
undermined because of different reasons, such as an information gap between 
principals and agents, mistrust between the Member States and the 
substantial number of Member States. 23  
 
Rittberger describes the development of the Parliament’s role in the Union’s 
decision-making process from a multi-level governance perspective.24  
Rittberger points to the fact that the European Parliament’s power in the 
Union’s decision making has steadily increased since the Single European 
Act from 1986. The increase in legislative power can be traced to two 
different paths of empowerment. The first is the path of interstitial 
institutional change. This kind of change transpires between the 
Intergovernmental Conferences (henceforth IGC).25 The Parliament uses the 
fact that treaty rules can be ambiguous and incomplete. The Parliament uses 
these ambiguities as leverage against other EU-institutions, like the Council 
and the Commission, to enhance its legislative powers. This means that 
institutional change is generated by the interpretation of rules and following 
bargaining among the EU-institutions. The bargaining among the Institutions 
can lead to informal practices being put in place. At upcoming IGCs there is 
an expectation on the Member States to turn these informal practices into to 
formal rules. The second path points to the changing of formal rules because 
of a perceived undermining of the prerogatives of the parliaments at the 
national and sub-national level. The deepening of the Union’s integration and 
shifting competences from the Member States to the Union leads to the 
perception of the existence of a democratic deficit. This leads to demands for 
increasing the Parliament’s legislative powers to reduce the democratic 
deficit. Rittberger emphasises that the crucial factor for this to happen is that 
the Member States are in a liberal democratic community. The Member 
                                                 
22 T Christiansen, 'Multi-level Governance and the European Union' in M Cini and Pérez-
Solórzano Borragán (ed), European Union Politics (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 
101.  
23 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 25-26. 
24 B Rittberger, 'Multi-level governance and Parliaments in the European Union' in H 
Enderlein et al. (ed), Handbook on Multi-level governance (Edward Elgar 2010).   
25 The Conferences in which Treaty reforms are negotiated. See Article 48 TEU. 
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States’ identity as democratic states forces them to accept and act in line with 
basic norms of a liberal democracy. When national parliaments and the 
representative democracy at the national level is under stress due to the 
transferral of power to the European level, the answers become to enhance 
the powers of the European Parliament. The increase of power of the 
parliamentary assembly at the European level is supposed to compensate for 
the reducing powers of the parliamentary assemblies at the national and, in 
some cases, regional levels. 26 
 
1.3.3 Multi-level governance in this thesis 
The multi-level governance theory is, in this thesis, used as theoretical basis 
and tool when discussing the Parliament’s involvement in the negotiations for 
a withdrawal agreement. The multi-level governance perspective 
acknowledges the Parliament as an actor that is not at the behest of the 
Member States but instead recognises that the Parliament could have its own 
agenda. Rittberger explains how the Parliament have used interpretation of 
treaty rules in arguing for increased legislative powers and also that the 
perceived existence of a democratic deficit leads to granting the Parliament 
more legislative powers. Rittberger’s explanations will be used in my analysis 
when I discuss the Parliament’s role in the negotiations for a withdrawal 
agreement. 
 
1.4 Method 
In this thesis, I will answer my research question with the help of the multi-
level governance theory. The theoretical base that the multi-level governance 
perspective provides, sees the Union’s institutions as actors separated from 
the Member States. Multi-level governance also argues that the Union 
Institution’s decision-making is influenced by other actors operating at 
different levels and that the also forms relations with actors at other levels.  
 
The different actors use the legal arguments to support their views. These 
legal arguments aim to explain how the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (henceforth CJEU) should decide if the Court is asked to resolve the 
issue. It is therefore relevant what these actors’ possible legal arguments are. 
In this thesis, the Parliament’s legal arguments are the central focus. 
 
The CJEU is to 'ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
the law is observed' according to Article 19(1) TEU. This also means that the 
CJEU has jurisdiction over the issue if the process for concluding the 
withdrawal agreement has been carried out in accordance with Union law. 
The CJEU has the authority to decide on disputes over competences between 
                                                 
26 B Rittberger (n 24) 242-244.  
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the Union’s institutions.27 In its Opinion from 2014 over the Union’s 
accession to the European Convention of Human Rights, the CJEU clarified 
that it has jurisdiction over any agreement concluded by the Union and a third 
country and an international organisation. The CJEU reasoned that according 
to 216(2) TFEU28, an agreement becomes binding on the Member States and 
EU-institutions and therefore becomes an integral part of Union law.29  Legal 
proceedings over the legality of the withdrawal agreement could, possibly, 
end up before the CJEU after a Member States, the Parliament, the Council 
or the Commission request an opinion from the CJEU over the compatibility 
with the Treaties according to Article 218(11) TFEU. Another possible route 
the withdrawal agreement’s legality could be decided by the CJEU would be 
an infringement proceeding according to Article 263 TFEU.  
 
I will in this thesis discuss the legal arguments for the Parliament’s 
involvement in the negotiations for a withdrawal argument that would be 
relevant in a dispute decided on by the CJEU.  
 
Proponents of the multi-level governance perspective points to the CJEU’s 
importance in creating the integrated polity which the Union has evolved 
into.30 The CJEU has not merely taken a role as impartial monitor making 
sure that in the interpretation and application Treaty law is observed (see 
Article 19(1) TEU). The CJEU has not viewed the Union being based on 
simply intergovernmental agreements and has instead constitutionalized the 
Union law. It has taken a more active role than only provided a solution to 
future contingencies created by incomplete contracting problems. The CJEU 
has used that the treaties have not strictly specified the Union institutions 
competencies but rather provided purposes and tasks, for example the 
completion of the internal market and custom union, for the cooperation in 
the Union. The CJEU has expanded the Union competencies in other policy 
fields with the reasoning that it is needed to reach the functional tasks 
provided for by the treaties. The CJEU has proven it to be an independent 
actor from the Member States and has in some instances pushed the European 
integration forward. The CJEU’s room to manoeuvre is, however, decided by 
the other actors such as the Commission, Member States, through the Council, 
and the Parliament. These other actors can change the legislation and reform 
the Treaties and it these ways restrain the CJEU’s possibility to push the 
integration forward. 31 The CJEU must, therefore, take the interest of these 
different institutions into consideration when deciding cases, especially in 
disputes between the different institutions on their prerogatives in policy 
decision making. Because the CJEU must take the different institution’s legal 
arguments in consideration in its decision-making, it is relevant to identify 
the legal arguments that could be addressed to the CJEU for and against the 
                                                 
27 U Bernitz and A Kjellgren, Europarättens grunder (5th edn, Norstedt Juridik 2014) 181; 
P Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2th edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 267-268. 
28 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016]  OJ 
C202/16 (henceforth TFEU). 
29 Opinion 2/13 EU Accession to the ECHR [2014] EU:C:2104:2454 para. 180.  
30 G Marks, L Hooghe and K Blank 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-level Governance' (1996) 34 J.Com.Mar.St. 341, 369-371. 
31 Ibid.  
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Parliaments’ involvement in negotiations for a withdrawal agreement under 
Article 50 TEU. In other words, the legal arguments which could persuade 
the CJEU that the level of Parliamentary involvement in the negotiations of 
the withdrawal agreement is either required or not in breach of the Treaties.  
 
Since both the primary and secondary law provisions many are the result of 
political compromises there can arise difficulties in interpreting the often 
general and ambiguous formulations.32 The CJEU uses different 
interpretation principles when analysing EU-law provisions. The central 
interpretation principles are Literal interpretation or Textualism, Contextual 
interpretation and Teleological interpretation.33 Because these 
interpretations methods are central when the CJEU interprets the law and 
assess legal arguments; these methods must also be used when analyzing the 
Parliament’s legal arguments.  
 
1.5 Sources 
A fundamental source is the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on The 
Functioning of the European Union. As mentioned above, the Article 50 TEU 
has never been applied by the CJEU before and there is no predecessor to the 
provision that has been used either. There is, therefore, no case law from the 
CJEU dealing directly with withdrawal process provided for by Article 50 
TEU. Nonetheless as will be demonstrated below (see chapter 2) the 
withdrawal procedure is, to a large extent, carried out through the same 
processes which applies for when the Union concludes international 
agreements with third countries and international organisations. The Union’s 
international relations and its competences to conclude international 
agreements has evolved through the case law of the CJEU.34 This case law 
can, therefore, provide support for legal arguments in the context of the 
procedure on negotiating a withdrawal agreement.  
 
Another important source of Union law, which can be used for legal 
arguments, are the General Principles.  The General Principles, as in several 
other areas, have been influential in developing the legal framework for 
international relations. In this thesis, the principles of institutional balance, 
the principle of sincere cooperation, both set out in 13(2) TEU, and of 
representative democracy will in particularly be discussed.  
 
The use of the travaux préparatories and reference to the Treaty drafters’ 
intentions have increased in later years and will probably play an even bigger 
                                                 
32 U Bernitz and A Kjellgren (n 27) 185. 
33 For more on the CJEU’s interpretation methods see K Lenaerts and J A Gutiérrez-Fonz, 
'To say what the law of the EU is: methods of interpretation and the European Court of 
Justice' (2014) 20(3) Colum. J. Eur. L. 
34 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 317, 321-322. 
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role in the future.35 Due to the efforts to make the draft-process for the 
Constitution for Europe transparent and that, later, many of Articles in the 
failed Constitutional Treaty was directly incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty, 
the CJEU has used the travaux in a larger degree.36  
 
I will refer to the positions of the Union’s institutions and of the UK 
government in official documents and other public statements such as press-
briefings. These sources are not used to support any legal arguments or 
conclusions but to connect this theses discussion to current development of 
the anticipated UK withdrawal from the Union. Through doing this, the 
intention is to make this thesis discussions and conclusions more relevant in 
the light of the withdrawal process, which is currently unfolding.  
 
Until the referendum in the UK on the exiting from the European Union, the 
legal commentary on Article 50 TEU and process of negotiating a withdrawal 
agreement was sparse. There was, however, some legal commentary by 
scholars when Article 50 TEU was established with the Lisbon treaty and its 
forerunner provision in the failed Constitution of Europe.37  Leading up to 
and following the British referendum the legal commentary has increased 
exponentially. The publications of academic books and Articles in academic 
journals considering the different legal aspects of the withdrawal procedure 
according to Union law have though not yet been extensive, though, but more 
publications will surely follow.38 There has however been a considerable 
amount of legal commentary at blogs specialising in Union law. 39  It is of 
course necessary to use these blogposts with some caution due to the lack of 
peer review and other forms of scrutiny that is done before in comparison 
with publications in academic journals. The arguments in these blogposts 
must yet be evaluated on their own merit and provides input on how to 
interpret law, especially when there are only a few academic publications 
available.  
 
                                                 
35 K Lenaerts and J A Gutiérrez-Fonz, 'To say what the law of the EU is: methods of 
interpretation and the European Court of Justice' (2014) 20(3) Colum. J. Eur. L. 23-24.  
36Ibid.  
37 See among others:  A F Tatham, 'Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!: EU 
Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon' in A Biondi, P Eeckhout and S Ripley (ed.), (EU 
law after Lisbon, Oxford University Press 2012); A Łazowski, 'Withdrawal from the 
European Union and alternatives to membership' (2012) 37(5) E.L. Rev 523; 37 R J Friel, 
'Providing a Constitutional Framework for the Withdrawal from EU: Article 59 of the Draft 
Constitution' (2004) ICLQ 33 407.  
38 See among others P Eeckhout and E Frantziou 'Brexit and Article 50 TEU: a 
constitutional reading', working paper, (UCL European institute, 10 January 2017) 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/brexit-hub/Article-50, accessed 22 April 2017; T 
Tridimas 'Article 50: An Endgame without End?'  (2016) 27 KLJ 297.  
39 Steve Peers, 'Guide to the Brexit Negotiations' (EU Law Analysis, 4 April 
2017)http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.se/2017/04/guide-to-brexit-negotiations.html accessed 
28 April 2017; H Flavier and S Platon 'Brexit: A Tale of Two Agreements' (European Law 
Blog, 30 August 2016) http://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/08/30/brexit-a-tale-of-two-
agreements/ accessed 19 April 2017; Andrew Duff, 'Everything you need to know about 
Article 50 (but were too afraid to ask)' (Verfassungsblog: on matters constitutional, 4 July 
2016) http://verfassungsblog.de/brexit-Article-50-duff/ accessed 3 February 2017. 
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1.6 Disposition 
After the introduction chapter follows chapter 2 where I first discuss the 
reasons why the withdrawal agreement should be seen as an international 
agreement. The general procedure for how the Union concludes international 
agreements is also discussed. In chapter 2 the increasing powers of the 
Parliament’s when it comes to international agreement is discussed and as 
well as the Parliament’s inter-institutional agreement with the Commission 
on, among other things, the procedure for concluding international 
agreements. Chapter 3 gives a short overview over the origin of Article 50 
TEU. In the following chapter 4, the procedure for concluding a withdrawal 
agreement according 50 TEU and 218(3) TFEU (which Article 50 TEU refers 
to) is discussed. Chapter 5 provides a brief discussion on the scope of the 
withdrawal agreement determined by its legal base Article 50 TEU.  In 
chapter 6 is where I discuss the concrete different ways the Parliament could 
influence the process of negotiating the withdrawal agreement but also the 
main factors determining the Parliament’s possibilities to influence the 
process of concluding a withdrawal agreement. The thesis is ended with a 
conclusion and analysis chapter where I will summarise and discuss my 
findings.  
 
1.7 Delimitations 
This thesis deals with the Parliament’s role in negotiations for a withdrawal 
agreement according to Article 50 TEU. The Parliament’s involvement in 
negotiations on an agreement regulating future, and more permanent, 
relations between the Union and UK will most likely (see chapter 4), be based 
on other provisions than Article 50 TEU. Therefore, the Parliament’s role in 
such possible negotiations will not be discussed at length in this thesis. For 
this reason, the possibility for the Parliament to bring proceedings against the, 
anticipated, withdrawal agreement after it has been concluded through the 
infringement procedure in Article 263 TFEU will not be discussed. The same 
goes for the possibility for the CJEU to decide on the legality of the 
withdrawal agreement through a preliminary ruling according to Article 267 
TFEU. In addition, the Parliament cannot ask the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling and is therefore not relevant for the research question of this thesis.    
 
Even though this thesis discusses the procedure for concluding a withdrawal, 
there is not room to discuss all aspects of the procedure but a selection must 
be made in the light of the research question of this thesis. For instance, will 
not the much-debated question if a notification, of a Member State intention 
to leave, according to 50(1) TEU is possible to revoke will not be discussed. 
This thesis, furthermore, not cover the parliamentary procedure for 
ratification in the UK of the expected withdrawal agreement.  
 
There is not room in this thesis to discuss the evolution of the historic 
development of the Union’s external relations. There is also, not room for 
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discussions on the rich case law from the CJEU on the Union’s competences, 
expressed or implied, to conclude international agreement. The same goes for 
discussion on whether competences are to be considered to be exclusive or 
shared.  
 
Due to time constrains, the developments of UK’s withdrawal procedure after 
the 19th of May is not considered.  
 17 
2 EU and International 
agreements 
First in this chapter, I discuss if the withdrawal agreement should be seen as 
an international agreement; an agreement which is binding under 
international law. Thereafter, a background is given over the general Union 
procedure for concluding international agreements. In particular, the process 
for concluding international agreements under Article 218 TFEU is discussed, 
this because Article 50(2) TEU refers to Article 218 (3) TFEU. The 
background for how the Union negotiates and concludes international 
agreements is given, in order to explain the similarities and differences 
between concluding international agreements in general and the procedure for 
concluding the withdrawal agreement under Article 50 TEU. It is not entirely 
clear, if the Union can conclude the withdrawal agreement on its own or if 
the Member States also need to become contracting parties. Therefore, the 
concept of mixed agreements is shortly described. Mixed agreements are 
agreements where both the Union and all, or some of the Member States also 
become parties to the agreement. Thereafter, I discuss, the over time, 
increased powers for the Parliament in the field of the Union’s external 
relations. The chapter ends with a discussion about the Framework 
Agreement between the Commission and the Parliament (henceforth the 
Framework Agreement)40, which, among other things, regulate the 
Parliaments right to be informed by the Commission on the process of 
concluding international agreements.  
 
2.1 The withdrawal agreement as an 
international agreement? 
An important question is how to characterise the withdrawal agreement. For 
some scholars, it is undisputed that it should be characterised as an   
international agreement.41 An alternative interpretation would see the 
withdrawal agreement as a suis generis agreement between the Union and one 
of its Member States. What is clear though, is that the framework provided 
for reaching a withdrawal agreement in Article 50 TEU, which refer to 218(3) 
TEUF, means that several futures in the ordinary process of concluding an 
international agreement also applies to the negotiations for a withdrawal 
agreement. The implications of this is that the UK will under the negotiation 
process to, a large degree, be regarded as a third country.42 
                                                 
40 Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission [2010] OJ L304/47. 
41 A Łazowski, 'Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership' 
(2012) 37(5) E.L. Rev 523, 528. 
42 This will further be discussed in chapter 4 and 6.  
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The Treaties do not define what constitute international agreements.43 The 
CJEU has, though, defined an international agreement as 'any undertaking 
entered into by entities subject to international law which has binding force. 
The formal designation does not have an effect on its legal status, whatever 
its formal designation.'44 What matter is if the parties’ intentions were that the 
document was supposed to have a binding effect.45 
 
Article 47 TEU states that 'the Union shall have a legal personality.'46 In the 
seminal ERTA-case the CJEU declared, from then Article 218 EC, that the 
Union (then Commmunity) has an international legal personality.47 Because 
the Union has an international legal personality, the Union has different 
abilities, such as to conclude agreements and become part of international 
conventions. The legal personality also means that the Union is subject to 
legal rights and responsibilities under international law.48 
 
Further guidance on what constitutes an international agreement can be found 
in international law. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties49 Article 2(1)(a): 
 
‘Treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two 
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation; 
 
The withdrawal agreement will regulate the relations between the UK and the 
Union after the withdrawal, therefore, it will regulate the relations between 
two different entities which are subject to international law. The withdrawal 
agreement should, consequently, be regarded as an international agreement. 
The procedure for concluding the international agreement according to 
Article 50 TEU and its relation to the Union’s general framework for 
concluding international agreements will be discussed further in chapter 4 and 
chapter 6.  
 
 
                                                 
43 B Van Vooren and R A Wessel, EU External Relations Law (Cambridge University Press 
2014) 40. 
44 Opinion 1/75 re Local Cost Standard [1975] ECR 1355, 1359-1360; C-327/91 France v 
Commission [1994] ECR I-03641 para 27. 
45 P Craig and C de Búrca (n 6) 350-351.  
46 See also Article 335 TFEU 
47 C-22/70 Commission v Council (AETR/ERTA) [1971] ECR 263 paras 13-14.  
48 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 321-322. 
49 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
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2.2 International agreements and 218 
TFEU 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the procedure for concluding international 
agreements was regulated in each of the different pillars. With the Lisbon 
Treaty and the removal of the pillar-system, there is now a general provision 
for the procedure of concluding international agreements in 218 TFEU.50 The 
CJEU has stated that 218 TFEU 'constitutes, as regards the conclusion of 
international treaties, an autonomous and general provision of constitutional 
scope'51.  International agreements in the field of the Common Commercial 
Policy (henceforth the CCP) and in the field of international monetary and 
exchanges are however governed through special procedures.52 
 
As mentioned in subchapter 2.1, the concept of international agreements is to 
be interpreted broadly, meaning any legally binding provision entered into by 
entities that are subject to international law. The form of the legally binding 
provision does not matter.53 International agreements are a central legal 
instrument for the Union to establish legal relations with international 
organisations and third states.54 218 TFEU deals with the internal procedure 
of concluding international agreements. The external procedure, the 
conclusion procedure for international agreements between the Union and 
third countries, is however governed by public international law.55  
 
Article 50(2) TEU states that the negotiations are to be conducted in 
accordance with Article 218(3) TFEU. According to 218(3) TFEU the 
process for concluding international agreements is, normally, initiated by the 
Commission, or the High Representative when the 'agreement envisaged 
relates exclusively or principally to the [CFSP]'56, through submitting 
recommendations to the Council on authorising the opening of negotiations.  
Even though it is the Commission that recommends to the Council to start 
negotiations, the EC often gives political guidance on the need for 
international agreements.57 As will be discussed further in chapter 3, the 
process of initiating the procedure for concluding a withdrawal agreement, 
starts instead with the notification by a Member State to the EC of its intention 
to withdraw from the Union.58     
 
The next step is the Council authorising the opening of the negotiations. The 
Council, usually, also adopt directives for the negotiation according to Article 
                                                 
50 R Geiger, 'Article 218' in R Geiger, D-E Khan and M Kotzur (ed), European Union 
Treaties (C.H.Beck, Hart 2015), 791.  
51 C-425/13 Commission v Council [2015] OJ C 274, para 62.  
52 See Articles 218(1) TFEU, 207 TFEU and 219 TFEU. 
53 C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-03641 para 27. 
54 B Van Vooren and R A Wessel (n 40) 34. 
55 R Geiger (n 50) 791. 
56 218(3) TFEU.  
57 P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 349-350. 
58 Article 50(1) TEU. 
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218(4) TFEU, often informally referred to as negotiating mandates.59 These 
directives are not published because of the advantage this would give to the 
counterpart in the negotiations. The directives to the negotiator are not usually 
very detailed but often quite general. Except for the directives, the negotiator 
must also often take into account the views of special committees, which are 
normally formed by representatives from the Member States.60 This, 
according to some authors, means that the Union-negotiator needs to 
negotiate against two counterparts.61 
 
The Council also appoints the negotiator or head of the negotiating team. 
Typically, that is the Commission but when the agreement falls under the 
CFSP-area, it is usually the High Representatives.62 The Council can exert 
control over the negotiations through the directives but also by forming a 
special committee which is to be consulted throughout the negotiations, 
according to Article 218(4) TFEU.  
 
Article 218(3) TFEU does not mention the Parliament. The Parliament has 
therefore not any formal role in decisions on initiating negotiations. The 
Parliament does, moreover, not have a formal say on deciding the directives 
to the appointed negotiator according to 218(4) TFEU.   
 
The Council concludes, together with the consent or consultation of the 
Parliament, and signs the agreement. In most cases the decision on opening 
the negotiations is taken through a qualified majority vote in the Council, this 
is also the case for the decision on concluding and signing an agreement.63 A 
qualified majority is also needed to authorise the opening and on the decision 
to conclude the withdrawal agreement according to Article 50(2) TEU. 
Unanimity is, though, needed in the Council when the agreement covers a 
field in where adopting internal rules requires unanimity, when it is an 
association agreement according to 217 TFEU, when concluding a 
cooperation agreement with an official candidate state for accession and when 
the agreement concerns the Union’s accession to the European Convention 
on Human rights (ECHR).64 The Council also needs for most agreements the 
Parliament’s consent before it can conclude an agreement. The Parliament 
must give its consent before concluding five types of agreements according 
to 218(6) TFEU: associations agreements65, agreements on the Union’s 
accession to the ECHR, agreements establishing a specific institutional 
framework by organising cooperation procedures, agreements with important 
budgetary implications, and finally, on agreements which covers a field where 
either the ordinary legislative procedure apply or where the special legislative 
procedure applies and when the consent of the Parliament is required. 
                                                 
59 See 218(4) TFEU; P Craig and G de Búrca (n 6) 350.   
60 See Article 218(4) TFEU.  
61 P Eckhout (n 27) 197. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Article 218(8) TFEU; P Eeckhout (n 27) 202. 
64 Article 218(8) TFEU. 
65 See 217 Article TFEU.  
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According to 218(6) TFEU the Council and the Parliament can agree on a 
time-limit for the Parliament giving its consent in urgent situations.   
 
Because the Parliament must give its consent for most agreements (see also 
subchapter 2.3) this means that the Commission and Council must take the 
Parliament’s views into consideration at the initiating and negotiations stages. 
I will discuss this at further length in chapter 6.  
 
The procedure in Article 218 TFEU also applies for mixed agreements.66 A 
mixed agreement is when, besides the Union, the Member States also become 
contracting parties. The solution with a mixed agreement is used when the 
desired agreement covers matters of which not the Union or the Member 
States have exclusive competence. Also, when the agreement covers matters 
of shared competence between the Union and the Member States, it can be 
concluded as a mixed agreement.67 The significant difference is that all the 
Member States’ different standpoints must be considered. For the withdrawal 
agreement with the UK, that is 27 Member States views and red lines which 
would have to be considered in addition to the Parliament’s views. The fact 
that the Member States become parties to mixed international agreements 
means that they need to sign and conclude the agreement. The Member States 
must, therefore, ratify the agreement which can be in some Member States 
and situations a time-consuming process. Due to the risk for delays, the 
Council usually does not sign the agreement before all the relevant Member 
States have ratified the agreement.68 
 
The Parliament also has a right to 'be immediately and fully informed at all 
stages of the procedure' according to Article 218(10) TFEU. I will discuss 
Article 218(10) TFEU in relation to the withdrawal agreement further down, 
see 6.3. There is also an Inter-Institutional Agreement between the 
Commission and the Parliament on the role of the Parliament in international 
agreements negotiations conducted by the Commission, see subchapter 2.6.  
 
Article 218(11) TFEU regulates the possibility for a preventive judicial 
control of international agreements. The judicial preventive control can 
generally be used; there are however certain limitation on agreements in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (henceforth the CFSP).69 A Member 
State, the Parliament, the Council or the Commission can ask for an opinion 
by the CJEU on whether a proposed agreement is compatible with the 
Treaties. If the CJEU considers the proposed agreement not to be compatible 
with the Treaties, the agreement must be amended, or the Treaties be revised 
for the agreement to be allowed to enter into force. The agreement does not 
need to be already negotiated and ready for signing, it is not even necessary 
for negotiations to have begun. The threshold for the CJEU to give its opinion 
is that, with sufficient accuracy, the content of the agreement can be 
                                                 
66 B Van Vooren and R A Wessel (n 40) 56.  
67 P Craig and G de Búrca, (n 6) 352. 
68 B Van Vooren and R A Wessel (n 40) 55-57. 
69 See Article 24(1) TEU, Article 275 TFEU and Article 40 TEU. 
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estimated.70 I will discuss, further down in 6.5, the possibility of the 
preventive judicial control in relation to the withdrawal agreement. The 
possibility for preventive judicial control does not prevent legal control after 
concluding the agreement. This can be done through, for instance, an 
annulment procedure according to Article 263 TFEU.71  
 
2.3 The Parliament’s increasing powers in 
external relations 
In this subchapter, I will discuss the Parliament’s over time increased powers 
when it comes to Union process of concluding international agreements. I will 
also discuss with a couple of examples, how the Parliament has previously 
used its powers to influence negotiations of international agreements.  
 
The parallelism paradigm has been guiding the evolution of the Unions 
external powers. The parallelism paradigm means that Union’s external 
powers should not be separated from the system of internal union measure. 
This paradigm, though, has not applied to the power balance and institutional 
roles among the Union’s institutions. The Parliament has been empowered in 
relation to the internal measures, but not to the same degree when it comes to 
external relations and measures. The Parliament has had a less powerful 
position than the Commission and the Council when it comes to the Union’s 
external relations. This follows the traditional system in democratic states 
where the executives, relatively, often have a more powerful role in external 
relations than the Parliaments.72  
 
The lagging role of the Parliament in external relations and in the process of 
concluding international agreements changed when the Lisbon Treaty entered 
into force. Through the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament’s role in concluding 
international agreement was enhanced in several ways. This development has 
changed the institutional balance in a direction towards the parallelism 
paradigm; the Parliament now enjoys a position more similar in external 
relations as it does in the internal legislative process. The Parliament must 
now give their consent before any international agreement can be concluded 
by the Council, Article 218(6)(a) TFEU, which is governed by the ordinary 
legislative process. Also, before the Lisbon Treaty, only 40 policy fields were 
subject to the ordinary legislative process. With the Lisbon Treaty, the 
number of policy fields in which the ordinary legislative process must be used 
rose to around 80 policy fields.73  
                                                 
70 R Geiger (n 50) 794 
71Ibid.  
72 D Thyme, 'Parliamentary Involvement in European International Relations' in in M 
Cremona and B de Witte (ed) EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals 
(Hart Publishing 2008) 203-204. 
73 C Eckes, 'How the European Parliament’s participation in international relations affects 
the deep tissue of the EU’s power structures' (2014) 12 ICON 907.  
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After the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament has used its veto-power and rejected 
international agreements, which have resulted in both academic and media 
attention.74 Two of the most famous examples are the TFTP-agreement75, also 
known as the SWIFT-agreement76, and the ACTA- agreement. According to 
some scholars, the Parliament has managed to assert its powers beyond its 
formal Treaty powers.77 These two examples show how the Parliament has 
used its powers under Article 218 TFEU to influence the negotiation process 
and that it not been a passive bystander during the negotiations. These 
examples provide insight in how the Parliament sees its role under the process 
of concluding international agreement and might give a clue of how the 
Parliament could act under the withdrawal agreement negotiations process.  
 
The TFTP-agreement was about the sending of financial data between the 
United States of America (henceforth the US) and the Union. The background 
was that, in practice, a Belgium company (SWIFT) denied the US access to 
such data because this kind of information had appeared in media outlets. In 
2009, a few months before the Lisbon Treaty came into force; the Council 
decided on a negotiating mandate for the Presidency to start negotiations. The 
proposed agreement belonged to the Third Pillar, which meant that 
Parliament did not take part in the decision-making.78 The day before the 
Lisbon Treaty entered into force, 30 November 2009, the agreement was 
signed, and it was to be provisionally applicable from February 2010. With 
the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament now had to give its consent to the agreement 
because parts of it fell under the ordinary legislative procedure. The 
Parliament had in September 2009 released a resolution that acknowledged 
the importance of a concluded agreement but stated that several concerns 
needed to be addressed before the Parliament would give its consent to the 
agreement.79 These concerns were about securing data protection rights. On 
the 11th of February 2010, the Parliament voted to reject the TFTP-agreement. 
Although the Parliament rejected the agreement with reference to the data 
protection rights not being secured, the rejection was widely regarded to be 
motivated by political motives.80 The agreement, though, was quickly 
renegotiated after the Parliament issued a recommendation for the adoption 
of a long-term TFTP-agreement. The Parliament gave its consent to the new 
agreement even though it only contained a few amendments which indicated 
                                                 
74Ibid. 909. 
75 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the 
United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J L 8/11. 
76 Due to the agreement would facilitate the transfer information from the company Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).  
77 K Meissner, 'Democratizing EU External Relations: The European Parliament’s Informal 
Role in SWIFT, ACTA, and TTIP' (2016) 21 E.F.A.Rev. 269. 
78 C Eckes (n 73) 909-910. 
79 For example, that the information was only to be used to combat terrorism and that the 
principle of proportionality was to be respected. 
80 C Eckes (n 73) 910. 
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that, at least partly, the Parliament had been disappointed with its involvement 
leading up to the conclusion of the agreement.81 
 
Another example is the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA).82 After the Council’s approval of the envisaged agreement, the 
Parliament did not give its consent to the agreement in 2012. One explicit 
reason for the Parliament’s rejection of the proposed agreement was the lack 
of information and documents being shared to the Parliament under the 
negotiating phase. The ACTA-agreement was not later concluded by the 
Union.83   
 
These two examples show that the Parliament has used its power to increase 
its influence over decision-making process of concluding international 
agreements. In the process of concluding the TFTP agreement, there were 
substantive differences between the EU-institutions on how to interpret the 
new procedural requirements, introduced through the Lisbon Treaty. The 
Parliament used its new veto-power to assert its influence over the 
negotiations.84  
 
Putting aside the discussion among scholars and politician if the increase of 
the Parliament’s powers is really making the process more democratic. It is 
clear that the Parliament has used its new veto-power, which it was given to 
render the EU’s external relations more democratic legitimacy, in a way to 
increase its role when the Union concludes international agreements.  
 
2.4 Access to information (on relations 
between the Parliament and the 
Commisssion). 
In addition to the right to be informed at all stages of the negotiations 
according to 218(10) TFEU, there is also a framework agreement between the 
Parliament and the Commission that, among other things, regulates the 
Commission’s obligation to share information on the process of negotiation 
and conclusion of international agreements. If the Parliament want to 
influence the negotiations for a withdrawal agreement, it is crucial that it has 
insight into how the negotiations are progressing and what the standpoints of 
the UK as well as the Commission and Council are.   
                                                 
81 C Eckes (n 73) 911. 
82 See council decision on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) between the 
European Union its member states, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of 
Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America, 12195/11, 23 August 
2011.  
83 C Eckes (n 73) 912. 
84 A Ripoll Servent 'The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after 
Lisbon' (2014) 21 J.E.P.P 578-579. 
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Through the Framework Agreement on relations between the European 
Parliament and the Commission85 (henceforth the framework agreement), the 
Parliament has strengthened its right to be informed of the negotiations 
process. The framework agreement is an Inter-Institutional Agreement under 
Article 295 TFEU, which means that it is binding as long as it complies with 
the Treaties. The framework agreement, could be argued, gives the 
Parliament greater rights to be informed than what the can be read out from 
the Treaty texts. The Commission is under an obligation to provide the 
Parliament with the information provided for in the framework agreement, 
and the agreement could be enforced by the CJEU with support of the 
principle of sincere cooperation.86  
 
Annex III to the framework agreement from 2010 states that the Commission 
shall inform the Parliament and the Council of its intention to start 
negotiations at the same time. It also states that when the Commission 
proposes draft negotiations directives, which are to be adopted by the 
Council, the Commission shall also present these draft directives to the 
Parliament and the Council at the same time. Furthermore, the framework 
agreement states that the Commission shall take account of the Parliament’s 
comments during the whole negotiation process and that the Commission 
shall also report if and how the Parliament’s comment were incorporated in 
the negotiated text. If the Parliament’s comments were incorporated, the 
Commission must report back the reason for this.87 In the cases where the 
Parliament’s consent is needed to conclude the international agreement, the 
framework agreement also states that the Commission must provide the 
Parliament with all the relevant information it provides to the Council. This 
includes the information provided by the Commission to the special 
committee the Council can appoint (see subchapter 2.2). The Commission is 
also obligated to keep the responsible Parliament Committee informed on the 
negotiation and especially how the Parliament’s views have been accounted 
for.88 
 
Eckes argues that especially the Commission obligation to justify why the 
Parliament’s comments were not incorporated and that the Parliament is to be 
informed in order 'to be able to express its point of view'89 gives the 
Parliament significant help. The time-factor is important because the 
executive often makes quick decisions when it comes international relations 
and the concluding of international agreements.90 
 
                                                 
85 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission 2010 O.J L 304/47.  
86 C Eckes (n 73) 908, 916.  
87 Annex III Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the 
European Commission 2010 O.J L 304/47 paras. 1-4. 
88Ibid 5.  
89 Framework Agreement (n 79) point 24.  
90 C Eckes (n 73) 909. 
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The Council has been critical of this framework agreement and has argued 
that the agreement challenges the institutional balance and undermines the 
limits of the different institutions’ powers (see Article 13(2) TEU). A 
competing principle though is that one of representative democracy (see 
Article 10 TEU) which can justify the strengthened role of the Parliament in 
the process of concluding international agreements.91  
 
As discussed in subchapter 2.1, there are good reasons for regarding the 
withdrawal agreement as an international agreement. There is therefore also 
possible to argue that the framework agreement between the Commission and 
the Parliament should apply to the process of negotiating and concluding the 
withdrawal agreement. The Framework agreement provides a legal argument 
for the Parliament to be informed of the developments in the negotiations. 
Without the access to the information, the Parliament’s possibilities to 
influence the negotiations of a withdrawal agreement are limited. This will be 
further discussed in chapter 6.  
 
                                                 
91 P Eeckhout (n 27) 201. 
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3 The origin of Article 50 TEU 
In this chapter, a short background to the establishment of the Article 50 TEU 
will be presented. The background gives the later discussions a context and 
will also shed some light on the wording of the Article.  
 
The first suggestions on introducing a provision which regulated a Member 
State’s possibility of leaving the Union was proposed under the Convention 
on the Future of Europe in 2002-2003.92 A secession clause was supported by 
the Federalists who wanted an established way out for those member states 
that did not want to take part in the ever-deepening integration.93 The original 
provision on a Member State’s voluntary withdrawal from the Union was in 
form of Article 46 of the Constitution. Article 46 was introduced since the 
UK did not share the objective of closer Union which the envisaged 
Constitution entailed.94 According to Andrew Duff, then a member of the 
European Parliament, who took part in the Convention; the writers of t Article 
50 TEU never actually thought it was going to be used.95  
 
Article 50 was introduced through the Lisbon Treaty. Before Article 50 TEU 
the dominating view was that EU treaties did not give member states a 
unilateral right to leave the union. There were, generally speaking, conflicting 
views between scholars who subscribed to the view of the Union with state-
like features and those who saw the Union as an intergovernmental 
organisation. The former considered that the Member States simply could not 
withdraw from the Union while the latter held the view that it was possible to 
leave according to customary law and the Vienna Convention on the law of 
Treaties from 196996. There was, tough, evidence that Member States had a 
right to leave after some kind of negotiations.97  
 
Under the Convention, the proposals ranged from provisions that the Member 
State would have an unrestricted right to leave to a provision stating that the 
Member States could not leave the Union at all. Friel classifies three principal 
categories of withdrawal mechanisms. The proposal that a Member State 
should have an unrestricted right to leave the Union belongs to a State 
primacy category. On the other side of the spectrum, the proposal that the new 
                                                 
92 P Eeckhout and E Frantziou 'Brexit and Article 50 TEU: a constitutional reading', 
working paper, (UCL European institute, 10 January 2017) 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/brexit-hub/Article-50, accessed 22 April 2017, 15. 
93 A Duff, 'Everything you need to know about Article 50 (but were too afraid to ask)' 
(Verfassungsblog: on matters constitutional, 4 July 2016) http://verfassungsblog.de/brexit-
Article-50-duff/ accessed 3 February 2017 
94 P Eeckhout and E Frantziou (n 92) 15.  
95 A Duff (n 93).  
96 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969: UNTS 331). 
97  A F Tatham, 'Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!: EU Accession and 
Withdrawal after Lisbon' in A Biondi, P Eeckhout and S Ripley (ed), EU law after Lisbon 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 142-143.  
 
 28 
treaty should have a provision declaring that a Member State could not leave 
the Union belongs to Federal primacy category. Between these two 
fundamentally conflicting views there is a Federal control category. The 
Federal control category, even though it acknowledges a right to leave, says 
that a Member State can only leave if the other, remaining Member States 
approve this. There were submissions on the right to leave the Union that 
adhered to all three categories.98  
 
The French representative, Dominique Villepin, suggested that a situation of 
irreconcilable differences must arise before a Member State would be 
allowed to leave.99 Robert Badinter’s, a former minister of justice in France, 
proposal was fairly close to the end result.100 Badinter’s proposal 
acknowledged the Member States’ sovereign right to withdraw but in a 
negotiated matter and the decision to leave must be taken according to the 
Member State’s national constitution Badinter’s proposal, though, did also 
contain provisions on that the leaving Member State would be responsible for 
any losses inflicted on the Union because of the Member State’s 
withdrawal.101 The provision on responsibility did not, however, make into 
the Constitution. The Convention did not settle for Villepin’s or Badinter’s 
proposal. The Convention settled for a formulation that is similar in substance 
to the one in Article 50 TEU. A formulation that acknowledges a Member 
State’s right to withdraw but introduces a framework for an agreement 
between the Union and the leaving Member State setting the arrangement for 
the withdrawal.102 After some non-substantial changes the provision was 
incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty.103  
 
Friel criticises the end result for not strictly adhering to any of the principal 
categories of withdrawal mechanisms. The formulation could be placed in the 
state primacy category, but because it does not allow for an instant withdrawal 
but require a negotiation period for two years (see the following chapter 4) it 
could be viewed as a hybrid. Friel’s main reason of criticism is that the 
provision is not principally stringent on where the authority lays on the right 
for withdrawal.104 I will return to the issue on the necessity of a withdrawal 
agreement or not in subchapter 4.1.  
 
                                                 
98 R J Friel, 'Providing a Constitutional Framework for the Withdrawal from EU: Article 59 
of the Draft Constitution' (2004) ICLQ 33 407, p. 423-24. 
99 P Eeckhout and E Frantziou (n 92) 13. 
100 A F Tatham (n 97) 147-148. 
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"A European Constitution" 30 September 2002.  
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accessed on 22 May 2017.  
102 Article I-59, Praesidium’s Draft Constitution Volume 1 – Revised text of Part , 28 May 
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104 R J Friel (n 98) 424-425. 
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4 The negotiation process 
according to Article 50 TEU 
Article 50 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with 
its own constitutional requirements. 
  
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council 
of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, 
the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out 
the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its 
future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in 
accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament.  
 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the 
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in 
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend 
this period. 
 
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or 
of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate 
in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions 
concerning it.  
 
       A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of           
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be 
subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49. 
 
Article 50 TEU declares that a member state can leave the European Union. 
The Article also outlines the process of withdrawal. The provision has 
received criticism for being far from clear and that it does not give enough 
guidance.105 In this chapter, I will outline the process of the withdrawal 
process according to the provisions Article 50 TEU and Article 218(3) TFEU. 
First, in subchapter 4.1, I will discuss the necessity of reaching a withdrawal 
agreement in order for a Member State to leave the Union. In subchapter 4.2 
I outline the process in Article 50 TEU and 218(3) for leaving the union and 
what is known after the EC has adopted their guidelines and the Commission 
has published their recommendations for negotiating directives. This chapter 
provides a description of the process of negotiating and concluding the 
withdrawal agreement as regulated by Article 50 TEU and 218 TFEU. Later, 
in chapter 6 will focus on how the Parliament could influence the process.   
 
                                                 
105 C Hillion 'Accession and withdrawal in the Law of the European Union' in A Arnull and 
D Chalmers (ed), The Oxford handbook: in European law (Oxford University Press 2015), 
135.  
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4.1 Must there be a withdrawal 
agreement? 
There is not any compelling legal argument for there being a requirement to 
reach a withdrawal agreement in order for a Member State to leave the Union. 
From a textual interpretation of only Article 50 TEU, it may seem like a 
Member State could not withdraw from the Union without a negotiated 
withdrawal agreement. The wording in 50(1) TEU 'Any Member State may 
decide to withdraw' indicates that the Member State can leave the Union if it 
is decided according to its own constitutional requirements. It is also possible 
for a Member State which has notified the EC of its intention to leave, 
according to Article 50(1) TEU, to simply wait out the two-year limit in 50(3) 
TEU. The wording of Article 50 TEU seems, though, to indicate a preference 
for a negotiated withdrawal agreement.106 
 
Łazowski argues that even though there might be legally sound arguments, 
for the possibility for a unilateral withdrawal, Łazowski considers it not being 
a realistic option due to the large economic and legal entanglement that exists 
through the Union. A unilateral withdrawal without a framework for the terms 
of the exit and future relations would have too big negative consequences.107      
 
4.2 The process in Article 50 TEU  
The withdrawal process starts when a Member State decides that it wants to 
leave the union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.108 It 
is unclear if the constitutional requirement is to be decided solely by the 
Member State’s national law or if certain aspects of Union law must be 
considered. Some scholars have argued that the decision should at least be 
valid in the light of the values listed in Article 2 TEU, such as the Union’s 
rule of law standards.109  
 
The next step is the notification of the Member State that wants to leave the 
Union, to the European Council.110 The UK notified the European Council on 
the 29th of March 2017 of its intention to withdraw from the Union.111 The 
                                                 
106 A Łazowski  'Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership' 
(2012) 37 E.L. Rev. 523, 526-528  
107 A Łazowski  'Unilateral withdrawal from the EU: realistic scenario or a folly' (2016) 23 
J.E.P.P 1294, 1300. 
108 Article 50(1) TEU.  
109 C Hillion (n 105), 137; A F Tatham (n 97) 149. 
110 Article 50(2) TEU. 
111 D Tusk 'Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the UK notification'  
(consilium.europa.eu 29 March 2017) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/03/29-tusk-remarks-uk-notification/ Accessed 23 May 2017.   
 
 31 
European Council is then supposed to set out guidelines according to which 
the Union is supposed to negotiate and conclude a withdrawal agreement with 
the leaving member state.112 The European Council’s guidelines is not a 
legally binding instrument because the it cannot exercise any legislative 
functions (Article 15(1) TEU). The guidelines will though have a major 
political weight.113 On the 29th of April the European Council (henceforth: the 
EC) adopted guidelines following UK’s notification under Article 50 TEU.114 
In the guidelines the EC reserves the right to revise the guidelines while the 
negotiations are in progress.115  
 
The withdrawal agreement is supposed to set out the arrangement for the 
withdrawal while also taking account of the framework for the future 
relationship between the Union and the Member State. The possible scope of 
the withdrawal agreement and the uncertainties surrounding it are discussed 
in chapter 5. Regarding the process for negotiations Article 50(2) TEU refers 
to the procedure described in 218(3) TFEU: 
 
The Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to 
the common foreign and security policy, shall submit recommendations to the 
Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and, 
depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union 
negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team. 
 
The Commission shall according to Article 218(3) TFEU submit 
recommendations to the Council, which then authorises the opening of the 
negotiations of the withdrawal agreement. The Council’s decision is taken 
with the same voting rules that apply to the conclusion of the agreement.116 
The Council also decides the Union’s negotiator.117 218(3) TFEU does not 
state that the Commission must be the negotiator.  In a statement, however, 
that followed the informal European Council in Brussels on the 15th of 
December 2016 with the 27 Heads of State or Government, it is stated that 
the Council will nominate the Commission as the negotiator for the Union. 
The statement is also positive to the Commission’s appointment of Michael 
Barnier as chief negotiator.118 The statement on the procedure, which is 
endorsed in the European Council’s guidelines119,  also points out the General 
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Affairs Council (GAC) as the Council figuration which will authorise the 
negotiations to start and will also deal with the subsequent steps of the 
negotiation process. The heads of state or government also declare that a 
representative from the rotating presidency will be included in the Union’s 
negotiating team as well a representative from the European Council 
President.120 The inclusion of the rotating presidency and the EC president is 
a new feature applied to these negotiations.121 The statement from the 15th of 
December describes a working party with a permanent chair which will make 
sure that the negotiations are conducted in line with the EC’s guidelines and 
the Council’s negotiations directives. The Working Party will help the 
negotiator with guidance.122 
 
The Commission published recommendation to the Council to authorising the 
opening of the negotiation and recommendations for negotiation directives on 
the 3 of May 2017.123 Usually, the directives are not made public.124 
 
The withdrawal agreement is to be concluded, according to 50(3) TEU, by a 
qualified majority of the Council after the Parliament has given its consent. 
Qualified Majority translates to 72 % of the Member States compromising at 
least 65 % of the population according to 338(3)(b) TFEU. This means that 
at least 20 of the 27 Member States must be in favour of concluding the 
agreement. How the Parliament gives it consent will be discussed in chapter 
6. The laid down procedure for the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement 
in Article 50 TEU is silent on the matter on ratification by the Member States, 
if the agreement would be considered to be mixed. This issue will be discussed 
in Chapter 5.  
 
Article 50(3) contains the, widely noted, two-year time limit from the date of 
notification to when the Treaties automatically cease to apply to the leaving 
Member State. In other words, the time limit gives the Union and the UK two 
years to agree to a withdrawal agreement and for it to enter into force, or else 
the UK will be out of the Union automatically. This, under the precondition 
that unless the remaining 27 Member States agree with the UK to extend the 
time period. The two-year time limit is by many considered to be a short 
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amount of time to negotiate an agreement that deals with the complicated 
issues of withdrawal. In a press briefing, the Commission appointed chief 
negotiator Michel Barnier, stated that the time for negotiations is short and 
will be shorter than two years. Barnier anticipates there will be time for 18 
months of negotiations and that an Article 50 Agreement could be reached in 
October 2018.125 However, Eeckhout has argued that the time limit in Article 
50(3) TEU must be interpreted in the light of the Union’s broader 
constitutional principles. With regard to these constitutional principles, 
Eeckhout argues that the in certain situations the clock could be stopped and 
the time limit prolonged. Eeckhot argues that the two-year time limit only 
expires if the parties agree that they will not reach an agreement. Hence, 
Eeckhout argues that clock would stop if example the UK would revoke its 
notification, if the CJEU is asked of an opinion according to 218(11) TFEU, 
if UK’s Parliament does not approve of the negotiated terms and asks the UK 
government to renegotiate or if the European Parliament would not give its 
consent to negotiated agreement. In addition, Eeckhout also interprets Article 
50(3) TEU as enabling to set an entry into force date which lay beyond the 
two-year period. This interpretation is based on that the treaties will cease to 
apply if 'failing' to agree in Article 50(3) TEU.126  
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5 The possible scope of the 
withdrawal agreement 
In this chapter I provide an overview of the possible scope of the withdrawal 
agreement. It is unclear if there is, and if so, what the limitation of the possible 
scope of the withdrawal agreement is. Therefore, I will give an overview of 
the discussion of what the withdrawal agreement could entail, before it 
changes character and possibly could become a free trade agreement (under 
Article 207 TFEU) or an association agreement (under Article 217 TFEU). 
If the agreement would change character this could potentially have an impact 
on the Parliament’s role in the negotiations. Besides the potential implications 
for the Parliament’s chances to influence the withdrawal agreement, these 
discussions also provide a context of the importance and effects of the 
withdrawal agreement. For similar reasons, Article 50 TEU as a legal basis 
for a transitional arrangement and the possibility for the withdrawal 
agreement being concluded as a mixed agreement, is discussed.   
 
5.1 The scope of the withdrawal 
agreement  
As mentioned above, Article 50(2) TEU states that the Union shall negotiate 
and conclude an agreement with the withdrawing Member State which sets 
'out the arrangement for its, withdrawal, taking account of the framework for 
its relationship with the Union'. From this wording, it is unclear if there are 
any limits to the material scope of the withdrawal agreement. On both the UK 
and the Union side there seems to be a common understanding on the need 
for, at least, two separate agreements. The EC’s guidelines divide the 
negotiating process into two phases. The first phase focuses on the 
arrangement of an orderly withdrawal. Only when sufficient progress has 
been made on the 'arrangement for an orderly withdrawal', an overall 
understanding on the framework for future relationship can be discussed 
under this second phase of the negotiations. The anticipated agreement on 
future relationship can however, according to the EC, only be concluded once 
the UK is a third country.127  The guidelines are also open for possible 
transitional arrangements to the necessary extent and if legally possible.128 
 
In its white paper from the 2nd of February 2017129, the UK government lay 
out its priorities for the negotiations of a withdrawal agreement and the future 
                                                 
127  European Council’s Guidelines Following the United Kingdom’s Notification Under 
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relationship between the UK and the Union. The UK government wants to 
reach an agreement on the future relationship before the end of the two-year 
limit on negotiations in Article 50(3) TEU. The underlining reason for this 
ambition is to avoid a gap period between the withdrawal and until the new 
relations are established. The UK government also wants to see a phased 
implementation from when the Article 50-process is concluded. The UK 
government pictures differentiated implementation phases for different areas, 
where the implementation is quicker in some areas than others.130  
 
Eeckhout and Frantziou argue in their working paper Brexit and Article 50: a 
constitutional reading that Article 50 TEU, on its own, is not likely to confer 
to the Union the competence to exclusively regulate the issues of withdrawal 
and fully regulate the future relationship between the Union and UK. They 
argue, tough that there is no legal impediment for the possibility to combining 
Article 50 TEU with another legal base. Depending on what the agreement 
would entail, if the agreement would be confined to the trade area, another 
legal base would be 207 TFEU on the CCP. Eeckhout and Frantziou also 
mention Article 217 TFEU on association agreement as a possible additional 
legal base if the future relations would cover a wide field of substantive 
areas.131 
 
In contrast to Eckhout and Frantziou’s views there is a reasonable 
interpretation of the wording of both 218(1) TFEU and in 207(3) TFEU, on 
the Common Commercial Policy), that refers to an agreement between the 
Union and a third country. Because the leaving Member State is not a third 
country until it has left the union, 207 TFEU and 218 TFEU cannot be used 
as legal base alone or in combination with Article 50 TFEU.132 
 
Flavier and Platon discuss the Article 50 TEU as a basis for the withdrawal 
agreement and make a separation between whether the article’s applicability 
is based on the leaving Member State’s, UK’s, status as a Member State until 
the withdrawal-day133 or the content of the withdrawal agreement.  If it is the 
leaving Member State’s status which is the deciding factor, the material scope 
of the withdrawal agreement is possibly unlimited. As long as the withdrawal 
agreement is concluded when the leaving Member State is still a member of 
the Union, Article 50 TEU can serve as the only legal basis for the withdrawal 
agreement. This means that such an agreement could also provide the basis 
for future relations between the UK and the Union and not only regulate the 
withdrawal issues but also set down an extensive framework for the future 
relationship. Flavier and Platon point out that this interpretation might 
contradict the principle of conferral in that the Union might not have the 
mandate to negotiate a withdrawal agreement that is unlimited in material 
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scope. The interpretation that the use of Article 50 TEU only depends on the 
leaving Member State’s status would certainly have its practical advantages. 
With such an interpretation either side does not need to be concerned with 
limiting themselves to a narrow interpretation of laying down the framework 
for a future relationship with the Union. The implications are almost opposite 
if the applicability of the Article 50 TEU as a legal basis depends on the 
content of the withdrawal agreement. If the applicability depends on the 
withdrawal agreement’s content the, possibly, difficult issue of maintaining 
the distinction between the agreement that regulates the withdrawal and the 
agreement that regulates the future relationship arises.134 
 
If it is as Eechkhout and Frantziou claims, that the Article 50 TEU could be 
combined with 207 TFEU or 217 TFEU and the withdrawal is regarded as a 
free trade or association agreement, the Parliament must still give its consent 
to such an agreement.135 As will be discussed in subchapter 6.2 the fact that 
the Parliament must give its consent to the withdrawal agreement gives it a 
powerful position to influence the negotiations and the final content of any 
agreement. If the agreement were considered to be a Free Trade or an 
Association agreement, then it would enable the Parliament to argue for the 
application of the general framework for concluding international agreements 
would apply. This would provide the Parliament with the possibility for 
example to argue that it should be fully informed according to 218(10) TFEU 
and for the possibility to ask the CJEU for an Opinion on the agreement’s 
compatibility with the Treaties according to 218(11) TFEU.136   
 
5.2 Article 50 TEU as legal base for a 
transitional agreement 
From the European Council’s guidelines adopted on the 29 April.137 It appears 
that the guidelines also are meant to apply on any form of transitional 
arrangements.138 The adopted guidelines also allow for the negotiations to 
determine transitional arrangements. This, however, is under the important 
preconditions that it is necessary, and more interestingly, legally possible. 
The guidelines declare that this must be in the Union’s interests and provide 
bridges for future relations. The, possible, transitional arrangement must be 
limited in time, clearly defined and subject to effective enforcement 
mechanisms. If the Union acquis still would apply after withdrawal 'this 
would require existing Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary 
and enforcement instrument and structures apply'.139 The Parliament’s 
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resolution also allows for transitional agreement but the resolution also sets a 
maximal time limit on the transitional arrangement for three years.140 The 
British government has in its white paper expressed it would want to see a 
phased implementation of the new future relationship.141 
 
It is clear from the guidelines, that the EC accept the possibility of a 
transitional agreement. The guidelines are not clear on whether Article 50 
TEU is to be the legal base by itself or in conjunction with another legal base. 
The guidelines do not explicitly rule out that the withdrawal agreement is 
concluded before the withdrawal as they are on any agreement on more 
permanent future relations. As Peers point out, it is unclear if Article 50 TEU 
can serve as a legal base for a withdrawal agreement, which regulates 
transitional arrangements.142 The guidelines seem to reflect this boundary 
issue on the scope for transitional agreements in that they allow for the 
negotiations on withdrawal agreements to the extent that it is legally possible.  
 
The objection towards Article 50 TEU as a single legal basis for a transitional 
agreement or the withdrawal agreement containing transitional arrangements, 
is the same as discussed in the previous subchapter, namely it is unclear if 
transitional arrangement falls in under the scope of Article 50 TEU.143  
 
5.3 A mixed withdrawal agreement?  
The most common view on the nature of the withdrawal agreement is that it 
is exclusive, meaning that the Union can conclude the agreement without 
ratification by the Member States. The wording of Article 50(2) TEU could 
also be interpreted as supporting this; '[the withdrawal agreement] shall be 
concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament'. The silence 
on any requirement on ratification by the Member States could therefore be 
interpreted as if the Union has the exclusive competence to conclude the 
withdrawal agreement. This interpretation would also make the task for the 
withdrawal agreement to enter into force possibly easier, which may be why 
it does not require the ratification by the Member States. The absence of 
parliamentary involvement from national, and in some cases regional level, 
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might seem questionable considering the possible width of the withdrawal 
agreement in relation the principle of conferral.144 
  
In its recommendations for Council decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations between the Union and the UK145 the Commission states: 
 
The Agreement will be negotiated and concluded by the Union. In this respect, 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union confers on the Union an exceptional 
horizontal competence to cover in this agreement all matters necessary to 
arrange the withdrawal. This exceptional competence is of a one-off nature and 
strictly for the purposes of arranging the withdrawal from the Union. The exercise by 
the Union of this specific competence in the Agreement will not affect in any way the 
distribution of competences between the Union and the Member States as regards the 
adoption of any future instrument in the areas concerned.146 
  
The Commission rejects that the withdrawal agreement should be concluded 
as a mixed agreement. The Commission also claim that it has, for this 
particular type of agreement, an unrestricted horizontal competence for 
arranging the withdrawal from the Union. This interpretation assumes, that 
the normal division of competences between the Union and the Member 
States do not apply. The Commission might reason that because of the fact 
that Article 50 TEU is silent on the on the matter of ratification by the Member 
States that it may indicate it was left out on purpose to make it easier to reach 
an agreement that enters into force.  
 
Flavier and Platon do not agree with the Commission on this. They argue that 
because the competence to conclude the withdrawal agreement is not listed in 
Article 3(1) TFEU and that there is substantial doubt on whether it can be 
regarded as an implied competence according to Article 3(2) TFEU. Due to 
the fact that 4(1) TFEU states that the Union shares competence with the 
Member States except when it comes to the ones in Article 3 TFEU and 6 
TEU (supplementary competences). Therefore, Platon and Flavier argue that 
it is questionable if the competence to conclude the withdrawal agreement can 
be regarded as an implied exclusive competence. If the withdrawal agreement 
only extends some common rules with the withdrawing state, it could be 
argued that the requirement in 3(2) TFEU of the conclusion of the 
international agreement affects 'common rules or alter their scope'. Flavier 
and Platon also point out that the withdrawal agreement could contain a 
provision in areas where the competence belongs to the Member States.147 
                                                 
144 C Hillion, 'Leaving the European Union, the Union Way – A legal analysis of Article 50 
TEU.' (2016) 2016(8) EPA 6.  
145 The Commission, Annex to the Recommendation for a Council decision authorizing the 
opening of the negotiations for an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union 
COM(2017). (3 May 2017),  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/annex-
recommendation-uk-eu-negotiations_3-may-2017_en.pdf  Accessed 10 May 2017. 
146 Ibid 5 (authors emphasis). 
147 Flavier and Platon mentions provisions on provisions that is regulated by the Montreal 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage 28 May 1999 or 
the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making 
and access to justice in environmental issues 25 June 1998.  
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That the withdrawal agreement must be concluded as a mixed agreement 
would subsequently render the process provided for in Article 50 TEU 
pointless. Flavier and Platon, therefore, recommend that the Union only 
exercise its exclusive competence in the withdrawal agreement and that the 
agreement does not contain provisions that are considered to be shared 
competences.148 
 
Eeckhout and Frantziou have a different perspective on whether the 
withdrawal agreement should be mixed agreement or not. They reason that 
the Member States have conferred the competence to Union to regulate the 
relationship with one of its Member States in areas covered by the Treaties. 
They refer to the example of free movement for the UK’s citizens, which is 
strictly regulated at Union level in contrast to the immigration from third 
countries. An agreement that would limit free movement would effectively 
return the competence to the Member States. Eeckhout and Frantziou mean 
that giving the Member States back their national competences must lie 
within the Union’s exclusive competence.149    
 
I found the arguments that the Union could conclude the agreement without 
the Member States most convincing. The wording of Article 50 TEU, which 
includes the silence on ratification by the Member States, supports this 
interpretation. The procedure in Article 50(2) TEU with arranging the 
withdrawal through an international agreement, the reference to 218(3) 
TFEU, seems to underline that it is a Union procedure. The procedure can be 
contrasted to the Accession procedure which explicitly calls for an agreement 
between the Member States and applicant State.150 
 
If the withdrawal agreement covers matter on the future relations and that it 
should be viewed as Free Trade agreement or Association agreement this 
could change the situation. Such an agreement would probably cover a wide 
range of matters and therefore make it necessary to conclude it as a mixed 
agreement.151 If the agreement would be concluded as a mixed agreement it 
would not directly have an implication for the Parliament’s role in the process 
for concluding the withdrawal agreement under Article 50 TEU. It is possible 
that it would be politically harder for the Parliament to get its way if also 
consideration had to be made to the Member States’ national parliaments and 
in some cases also regional parliaments. 
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6 How the Parliament can 
influence the negotiations 
In this chapter I will discuss the more specific aspects that have bearing on 
the Parliament’s role in the negotiations for a withdrawal agreement.  First, I 
discuss the procedure for concluding the withdrawal agreement in Article 50 
TEU and its relation to the general framework for concluding international 
agreements in 218 TFEU. Then I discuss the implication that the Parliament 
must give its consent to any withdrawal agreement under Article 50(2) TEU. 
In connection to discussing the Parliaments veto-power I briefly discuss the 
Parliament’s tool to adopt resolutions manifesting their standpoint. Then 
follows to subchapters discussing the requirement to inform the Parliament in 
218(10) TFEU and possibility for the Parliament to ask the CJEU for an 
Opinion on an envisaged agreement compatibility with the Treaties according 
to 218(11) TFEU.  
 
6.1 Article 218 TFEU in its entirety, or only 
218(3) TFEU? 
Article 50(2) TEU explicitly refers to 218(3) TFEU. This has created 
uncertainty on whether the rest of Article 218 TFEU, the general procedure 
for concluding international agreement, is applicable on the withdrawal 
agreement, including, the much discussed the provisions in this thesis 218(10) 
and 218(11) TFEU.152 If the general procedure for concluding international 
agreement would apply to the process of negotiating a withdrawal agreements 
this would consequently have direct implications for the Parliament’s role and 
possibilities to influence the negotiations for a withdrawal agreement.  
 
A literal interpretation of Article 50(2) TEU, which states that '[the 
withdrawal] agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3)' 
could lead to the conclusion that only 218(3) TFEU is applicable on the 
procedure for negotiating the withdrawal agreement. Such an interpretation 
could be supported by a literal interpretation of Article 218(1) TFEU, which 
states that procedure laid down in the provision is for 'agreements between 
the Union and third countries or international organisations',153 because the 
leaving Member States is not yet a third country and in fact becomes a third 
country with the withdrawal agreement entering into force (Article 50(3) 
TFEU). Therefore, it would be contradictory to 218(1) TFEU if the general 
framework laid down in 218 TFEU would apply to the procedure for 
concluding a withdrawal agreement. From a literal interpretation is though 
not clear if the wording excludes application of the rest of Article 218 TFEU. 
 
                                                 
152 E Poptcheva (n 2) 5.  
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Another argument for the non-application of the general procedure for 
concluding international agreements in 218 TFEU is that the rationale for 
Article 50 TEU and the reference to only 218(3) TFEU was to ease the 
process of concluding a withdrawal agreement. The exclusion of the other 
provisions in Article 218 could be to ease the conclusion of a withdrawal 
agreement and therefore avoid the complicated consequences that would arise 
if the Treaties simply would cease to apply.154  
 
It is, however, questionable if 218(3) TFEU could be applied without the 
general framework it belongs to in Article 218 TFEU as a whole. It is also 
questionable if was intentions of the drafters of the Treaties that only 218(3) 
TFEU would apply to the procedure and not the general framework in 218 
TFEU which 218(3) TFEU belongs to. It could be argued it is necessary to 
look at 218(3) TFEU in its context as part of Article 218 TFEU. 218(3) TFEU 
could be argued is interlinked with the rest of its Articles and that it could not 
be carved out and applied on its own. The negotiations process as it laid down 
with 218(3) TFEU is complemented through 218(4) TFEU which gives the 
Council the possibility to 'address directives to the negotiator and designate a 
special committee in consultation with which the negotiations must be 
conducted.' In its recommendations for Council decision on authorising the 
opening of the Commission gives a proposal on directives for the 
negotiations, without explicitly referring to 218(4) TFEU.155 This is 
indicative of the necessity to read 218(3) TFEU in its context. 
 
As will be discusses further below in subchapter 6.3 and 6.4, in consistence 
with the CJEU’s previous case law, a teleological interpretation of 218(10) 
and 218(11) TFEU shows that there are sound legal arguments for these 
provisions being applicable on the withdrawal agreement negotiations.   
 
6.2 Consent to the withdrawal agreement 
According to Article 50(2) TEU the withdrawal agreement is to be concluded 
by the 'Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament'. Article 231 TFEU states that unless otherwise 
provided by the Treaties the Parliament is to decide by a majority vote. The 
quorum is to be decided by the Parliament’s rules of Procedure156. Rule 
168(2) of the Parliament’s Rule of Procedure states that a quorum exists when 
one third of the competent of Members of Parliament are present. The 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on the withdrawal agreement, Rule 81, also 
states that the Parliament shall decide on giving its consent by a majority of 
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the votes cast. Therefore, if at least a third of the competent members of 
parliament are present the Parliament decides with a majority vote.  
 
What is also worth mentioning is that the Members of Parliament from the 
UK are allowed to vote. Article 50(4) TEU only refers to the UK’s 
participation in the Council and the European Council in the discussion and 
decision referred to in 50(2) and 50(3) TEU. There is no restriction on their 
participation until the UK has left the Union.   
 
The undisputed fact that the Parliament must give their consent to negotiated 
withdrawal agreement to Article 50(2) TEU gives it a form of veto-power. 
The Parliament has through the veto-power the possibility to force the 
Council, the Commission and the UK government to take its views into 
account. The time limit of two years, in Article 50(2) TEU, does not provide 
ample of time to negotiate the complicated issues of withdrawal and in 
addition a general understanding of a framework for the future relationship. 
It might, therefore, arise a situation in where the Parliament comes under 
enormous pressure to give its consent to an envisaged agreement. If it not 
gives its consent, the time could simply run out and the UK would be regarded 
as a third country. As, discussed above in subchapter 4.2, Piet Eeckhout 
argues that forcing the Parliament to give its consent would be contrary to the 
broader constitutional norms of the Union.157 In a lecture, Article 50 TEU: the 
secret and lies, held by Eeckhout on the 28 of March 2017, he argues that the 
Parliament giving its consent to an agreement is based on the principal of 
representative democracy. This should mean that the Parliament is not left 
with merely rubberstamping but if the Parliament does not give its consent, 
there should be the possibility for a renegotiation of the agreement.158 The 
Parliament’s ability to debate and reach a reasoned decision is dependent on 
access to information. The Parliament needs to receive information on the 
envisaged agreement which, consequently, lead to the discussion on the 
applicability of the information requirement in 218(10) TFEU, see the 
discussion further down. As discussed in subchapter 2.3 the Parliament has 
also previously used its veto-power to force the Commission and Council to 
acknowledge its views.  
6.2.1 The Parliament’s resolution: red lines for 
the withdrawal agreement  
On the 5th of April 2017, the Parliament adopted a resolution declaring its 
standpoints on the negotiations for withdrawal and the future relations 
between the Union and the UK.159 The Parliament explicitly requested that 
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the EC take the resolution into account when formulating its guidelines.160 
The Parliament states that the development and results of the negotiations will 
be accessed on basis of the resolution.161 The Parliament is also making that 
it will only give its consent to an agreement under the precondition it has been 
fully involved in the negotiations process for the withdrawal agreement.162  
 
The Parliament’s resolution from the 5th of April supports the EC’s guidelines 
in that the withdrawal agreement is to concern the withdrawal agreement and 
transitional arrangement being based on the account for the future relationship 
can only be discussed when substantial progress has been made towards the 
withdrawal agreement. In its resolution, the Parliament also adheres to the 
EC’s view that the agreement on future relationship can only be concluded 
once the UK has become a third country.163 
 
The Parliament could adopt more resolutions throughout the negotiation 
process and in that way, publicly, put pressure on the other Institutions and 
the UK to consider their standpoints and red lines.   
6.3 218(10) TFEU 
The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all 
stages of the procedure. 
 
I will in this subchapter discuss the duty laid down in 218(10) to inform the 
Parliament at all stages of the procedure in concluding an international 
agreement. The CJEU has in two cases elaborated on what this requirement 
entails and what the consequences are if the requirement is not met. I will, 
therefore, go through the CJEU’s reasoning in these two cases, C-658/11 and 
C-263/14, which are the two existing cases to date where the CJEU has 
elaborated on the purpose behind 218(10) TFEU. These two cases also 
concern the issue if the agreements relate exclusively to CFSP in the meaning 
of Article 218(6) 2 subparagraph and the Council therefore can conclude the 
agreement without the consent or consultation of the Parliament. Because this 
procedure is not of direct relevance to this thesis’s research question, they 
will not be discussed at length. The subchapter continues with a discussion 
about 218(10) TFEU and the withdrawal agreement. The uncertainty, based 
primarily on textual interpretation of Article 50 TEU and 218 TFEU, on 
whether 218(10) TFEU is relevant in the procedure for concluding the 
withdrawal agreement has already been discussed in subchapter 6.1.  
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6.3.1 C-658/11 Parliament v. Council (Pirate 
Transfer Agreement with Mauritius) 
 
In C-658/11164 The CJEU annulled a Council decision on signing and 
concluding an Agreement between the Union and the Republic of Mauritius 
(henceforth Mauritius), on the transfer of suspected pirates and associated 
seized property from a Union-led naval force to the Mauritius, due to failures 
of the Council to inform the Parliament according to 218(10) TFEU. The 
Parliament had two pleas, first that the Council had infringed the second 
subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU and the second, that the Council had 
not informed the Parliament according to the requirements in 218(10) TFEU.  
 
The Parliament’s first plea was based on a textual interpretation of the second 
subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU according to which the Council only 
can conclude an international agreement that 'relate exclusively to the 
[CFSP]'. The Parliament did not dispute that correct substantive legal basis 
for the agreement was Article 37 TEU. The Parliament, though, argued that 
the disputed agreement also related to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, police cooperation and development cooperation and, therefore, that 
the agreement did not exclusively relate to CFSP according to Article 218(6) 
second paragraph.165 The Parliament, with support from the Commission, 
argued that Article 218(6) TFEU should be read as saying that the Parliament 
must give its consent or be consulted if the international agreement also has 
other aims than those that exclusively belong to CFSP-area, because the 
agreement in those situations do not exclusively relate to CFSP.166  
 
In its second plea, the Parliament argued that the Council had not fulfilled its 
duties according to 218(10) TFEU and kept the Parliament fully informed 
under all stages of the procedure.167 The background was that the Council had 
on the 22nd of March 2010 authorised the High Representative to open 
negotiations to conclude an international agreement with Mauritius. The same 
day the Council informed, by letter, the Parliament. On the 12th of July 2011, 
the Council decided to authorise the signing of the agreement. The decision 
was published on the 30th of September 2011 in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (henceforth: Official Journal). The Parliament was though 
only informed of the Council’s decision after 3 months and 17 days after its 
publication in the Official Journal.168  
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Both Advocate General (henceforth: AG) Bot in his opinion169 and the CJEU 
rejected the Parliament’s first plea170. The CJEU states that following on the 
entry into force by the Lisbon Treaty and Article 218 TFEU regarding the 
objectives of Article 218 TFEU:  
 
As regards the objectives of Article 218 TFEU, it must be noted that, 
following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in order to satisfy the 
requirements of clarity, consistency and rationalisation, that Article now lays 
down a single procedure of general application concerning the negotiation 
and conclusion of international agreements which the European Union is 
competent to conclude in the fields of its activity, including the CFSP, except 
where Treaties lay down special procedures.171 
 
The CJEU proceeds with confirming AG Bot’s statement in his opinion that 
Article 218(6) TFEU 'establish symmetry for adopting EU measure internally 
and the procedure for concluding international agreements in order to 
guarantee that the Parliament and the Council enjoy the same powers in 
relation to a given field, in compliance with the institutional balance provided 
for by the Treaties.'172 The CJEU reasoned when a legitimate substantive legal 
basis is established, in this case Article 37 TEU, which belongs to the CFSP-
area, the Parliament does not need to be consulted or give its consent. The 
CJEU did consequently also reject the Parliaments textual interpretation.173 
 
The Council and the intervening Member States argued that the CJEU did not 
have jurisdiction because the decision falls exclusively under the CFSP area 
where CJEU does not have jurisdiction, Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275 
TFEU. The Council was also of the opinion that the Parliament was duly 
informed according to the requirements in 218(10) TFEU. 174 The CJEU, as 
well as AG Bot175, considers that it has jurisdiction over the application of 
218(10) even though it is agreement that relates exclusive to CFSP. This is 
because the procedural provisions in Article 218 TFEU are not included in 
the exemption from the CJEU’s jurisdiction over the CFSP in Articles 24(1) 
and 275 TFEU.176 
 
Concerning the Parliament’s second plea, AG Bot considers 218(10) to be 
applicable in all of the Union’s areas. This means that the requirement to 
inform the Parliament applies generally when the Union concludes 
international agreements, including agreement that relate to CFSP.177 AG Bot 
though considers that the level of information and with which frequency the 
Parliament should be informed depends on whether the Parliament’s consent 
or not is needed for conclusion. AG Bot, consequently, argues that the 
Parliament should be informed more quickly and more thoroughly when the 
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conclusion of an international agreements requires the Parliament’s consent. 
AG Bot point to the need for the Parliament to be fully informed and in good 
time to be able to give a reasoned opinion. AG Bot further states that 
assessment of whether or not the Council has fulfilled its duty to inform the 
Parliament depends on the character of the international agreement and what 
authority the Parliament has to influence the substance of the treaty according 
to Article 218(6) second paragraph. That the Council’s duty to inform the 
Parliament varies, depending on the type of agreement, does not however 
mean that the Parliament loses its right to be fully informed on all stages 
because the international agreement relates exclusively to the CFSP.178  
 
AG Bot did not, however, consider that the Council had not performed its 
duty to such a degree that the Council decision on concluding the agreement 
should be annulled.179 AG Bot did, though, point out that, that it would have 
been more in line with Article 218(10) TFEU if the Council had informed the 
Parliament of the decision before it was published in the Official Journal and 
not three months after the contested decision was taken. 
 
The CJEU then addresses the Parliament’s next claim, that the Council’s 
decision to conclude the agreement with Mauritius should be annulled due to 
the failure to fully inform the Parliament at all stages of the negotiation as 
provided for in 218(10) TFEU. 
 
The CJEU decides that the Council did not sufficiently inform the Parliament 
and thus infringed Article 218(10) TFEU. The CJEU states that the procedural 
rule in 218(10) TFEU constitutes an essential procedural requirement in the 
second subparagraph of Article 263 TFEU. An infringement of that procedure 
therefore leads to that the measure should be annulled.180 It was an 
infringement because it took over three months for the Council to inform the 
Parliament that it had adopted the decision. It was, furthermore, not enough 
that the Council had published the decision in the Official Journal. The CJEU 
established that the obligation arising from 218(10) TFEU is in place in order 
for the Parliament to be in a position so that it can exercise democratic 
scrutiny and, especially, verify that the correct legal basis has been chosen so 
it can protect its prerogatives. The CJEU repeats that the Parliament’s 
involvement in the Union’s decision-making is an expression of the 
democratic principles Union is founded on, in that people should take part in 
the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly. 
The CJEU further states that with the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of 
this new separate provision, which is applicable on all procedures that are 
envisaged in Article 218 TFEU, the importance of this rule has been 
enhanced. Even though the Parliament has a limited role in the CFSP area, it 
still has the right to scrutinise the Union Policy. The Parliament needs to be 
informed on all stages of the procedure of concluding international 
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agreements to be able to scrutinise the measure, especially for making known 
its standpoint concerning the right legal basis for the measure.181  
 
Though the decision was annulled, and in extension the agreement with 
Mauritius, because both the Parliament and Council requested the effects of 
the annulled decision, through Article 264 TFEU the second subparagraph, 
be maintained until it is replaced the CJEU the ruled that the effects of the 
annulled decision would be maintained.182  
 
6.3.2 C-263/14 Parliament vs Council (Pirate 
transfer agreement with Tanzania) 
In the case C-263/14 the background was similar to the one C-658/11, though 
this agreement was with the United Republic of Tanzania (henceforth 
Tanzania).  In a letter from the Council on the 22nd of March 2010 to the 
Parliament, the Council states it was important to start negotiations with, 
among other countries, Tanzania. On the same day, the Council authorised 
the High Representative to start negotiations. Then the Council informed the 
Parliament on the 19th of March 2014 that it had decided to conclude the 
agreement on the 10th of March 2014.183 When informing the Council on 19th 
of March 2014 the Council did not present the wording of the contested 
decision or the text of the disputed agreement.184 
 
The Parliament sought an annulment through Article 263 TFEU of the 
Council decision on concluding the agreement with Tanzania. The Parliament 
had two pleas that were similar to them in C-658/11. The first plea was that 
the Council decision to conclude the agreement had been based on the wrong 
legal basis, Article 37 TEU, and the procedure for agreements that exclusively 
relates to the CFSP. The Parliament considered the correct legal basis for the 
agreement to be Article 37 TEU, although not alone. The Parliament argued 
that the provisions on judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation, Articles 82 and 87 TFEU, must also be seen as correct legal 
bases, in combination with Article 37 TEU, for the agreement. The 
Parliament, therefore, thought the decision should have been adopted through 
the procedure prescribed for in Article 218(6) in point (a)(v). This means the 
Parliament must give its consent for the agreement to be concluded. The 
Parliament here challenges the substantive legal basis in contrast to in C-
658/11 where the Parliament accepted Article 37 TEU as the correct sole legal 
base.   
 
The Parliament’s second plea was, as in C-658/11, that the Council had 
infringed Article 218(10) TFEU by not informing the Parliament at all stages 
of the negotiations.185  
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The CJEU reached the conclusion, like in C-658/11, that the aim of the 
agreement with Tanzania falls predominantly within the scope of the CFSP. 
The aim does, consequently, not fall within the scope of judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters or police cooperation. The CJEU, therefore, holds that the 
decision could be based on only Article 37 TEU, and hence, the Parliament’s 
consent was not needed to conclude the agreement.  
 
On the second plea AG Kokott, elaborates on the purpose of the requirement 
of informing the Parliament in 218(10) TFEU. AG Kokott considers the 
requirement in 218(10) TFEU to keep the Parliament immediately and fully 
informed at all stages of the procedure is a reflection of the democratic 
principle that applies to all decision-making process at the Union level.186 In 
contrast to AG Bot’s reasoning in his Opinion in C-658/11, AG Kokott does 
not consider that the duty to inform the Parliament is more or less strict 
depending on whether the Parliament is to give its consent or not. AG Kokott 
considers the information requirement is not just there for the Parliament to 
be able to exercise its formal rights, but that there is a value in itself that the 
Council must inform the Parliament. The duty to inform the Parliament 
creates transparency, which in itself produces an element of democratic 
control which has an inherent value. AG Kokott expands on the transparency 
aspect on the requirement of informing the Parliament. Kokott belives the 
'transparency is a corollary of the fundamental principle that decisions in the 
European Union are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to 
the citizen (second paragraph of Article 1 TEU).'187AG Kokott means that this 
gives those involved in the Union’s external relations an incitement to act 
more responsibly and 'ensures that the elected representatives of the citizens 
of the Union have an opportunity, in full knowledge of the facts, to have a 
public debate on foreign policy matters of general European interest and to 
scrutinise the entire procedure for the conclusion of an international 
agreement critically through spontaneous expressions of opinion.'188 AG 
Kokott means that this gives the elected representatives a possibility to, in a 
legitimate way, influence the content of the agreements. AG Kokott also 
states that the lessons from the recent examples, among others the TFTP-
agreement and the Union’s accession to the ECHR, of the Union conclusion 
of international agreements show the importance of parliamentary democratic 
control.189 AG Kokott ends her general remarks with stating that, besides 
what is mentioned above, 218(10) TFEU 'ensures that the Parliament is able 
to examine critically the Council’s choice of the – formal and substantive – 
legal basis and, if appropriate, make known its views on the matter'190. 
 
After making these general remarks, AG Kokott evaluates if the Council had 
fulfilled the duty in 218(10) in the present case. AG Kokott evaluates the 
requirement in different steps, first if the Council informed the Parliament at 
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all stages, then if the Parliament was fully informed and finally if the 
Parliament was immediately informed. AG Kokott considers that even though 
the Council informed the Parliament of the initiating of the negotiations and 
of the Council’s decision to conclude the agreement, the Council did infringe 
218(10) TFEU by not informing the Parliament during the ongoing 
procedure. The Parliament’s right to information cannot be the same as the 
special committee under 218(4) TFEU nor to be notified of purely preparatory 
internal process, such as discussions in Council working groups.191 AG 
Kokott, though, considers that the 'Parliament must be informed about 
intermediate results achieved, significant progress in negotiations and any 
major difficulties arising during the negotiations. Information must always be 
provided – having regard to all circumstances of the individual case and, if 
necessary, with appropriate steps being taken for the confidential treatment 
of sensitive information – in such a way as to allow the Parliament sufficient 
room effectively to exercise its power of control.'192  AG Kokott consequently 
finds that because the Parliament did not receive information on the ongoing 
procedure, the Council infringed Article 218(10) TFEU.193 
 
AG Kokott does though not stop there but moves on and finds that the Council 
infringed 218(10) TFEU through not fully informing the Parliament. The two 
letters, on the decision on initiating negotiations and on the decision to 
conclude the agreements, the Council did send to the Parliament should have 
included information on the negotiations directives, based on Article 218(4) 
TFEU, and they should also have contained information on the desired 
content of the planned agreement.194 In connection to this, AG Kokott 
dismisses the Council’s argument that the publication in the Official Journal 
would mean that the Parliament was sufficiently informed, partly because it 
would have adequately time to launch an annulment action according to 
Article 263 TFEU. According to AG Kokott the judicial review that is 
possible through Article 263 TFEU is not all the same as democratic review 
as 218(10) TFEU provide for. The democratic review would be much less 
effective if it only could take place after the agreement is concluded but if it 
is exercised on an early stage it can prevent legal disputes between the 
Union’s institutions.195 
 
AG Kokott also considers that the Council, furthermore, did not immediately 
inform the Parliament when it first notified the Parliament a week after it 
decided to conclude the agreement. AG Kokott considers that this delay 
'shows a lack of respect for the representative body of the people which is not 
consistent with the wording and spirit of Article 218(10) TFEU or the 
principle of sincere cooperation among the institution'196. In conclusion AG 
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Kokott founds the Parliament’s second plea is well-founded and the Council 
decision should be annulled.197 
 
On the second plea, the CJEU first confirms what it said in C-658/11, namely  
that the duty to inform the Parliament at all stages of the negotiations, apply 
on all the Union’s international agreements, including the ones that belong to 
the CFSP. Also, the CJEU, as in C-658/11, stated that 218 TFEU 'in order to 
satisfy the requirements of clarity, consistency and rationalisation, lays down 
a single procedure of general application concerning the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements by the Union in all the fields of its 
activity, including the CFSP which, unlike other fields, is not subject to any 
special procedures'.198 The CJEU also reiterates that the information 
requirement is there to make sure that the Parliament is in a position so it can 
exercise its democratic control. The Parliament’s democratic control over the 
Union’s external action, and especially to verify that the chosen legal basis, 
does not inflict on the Parliament’s prerogatives.  
 
The CJEU also clarifies that the duty to inform the Parliament, in particular, 
covers the negotiation phase. The duty to inform includes the stages of:  
 
[…] inter alia, the authorization to open negotiations, the definition of the 
negotiations directives, the nomination of the Union negotiator and, in some 
cases, the designation of a special committee, the completion of negotiations, 
the authorization to sign the agreement, where necessary, the decision on the 
provisional application of the agreement before its entry into force and the 
conclusion of the agreement.199 
 
 Also, in addition to these stages, the information requirement also applies to 
intermediate results including the draft agreement and draft decision 
approved by the Council’s Foreign Relations Counsellors. Because the 
agreement at hand falls exclusively under CFSP the information requirements 
do not apply to the Council’s preparatory process.200 The CJEU rejects the 
Council’s arguments that because the agreements was similar to previous 
agreements and the publication in the Official Journal, once again, the 
Parliament was sufficiently informed and in a position to exercise its 
prerogatives. The CJEU concludes that the infringement of Article 218(10) 
TFEU is detrimental to the ability for the Parliament to perform its duty and 
must be seen as an infringement of an essential procedural requirement.201 
The CJEU, therefore, found that the contested decision must be annulled. The 
CJEU decided however, being requested by both the Parliament and the 
Council, that the effects of the decision should be maintained through the 
second subparagraph in Article 264 TFEU not to hamper the conduct of the 
operations carried out on the basis of the Union-Tanzania Agreement.202 
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6.3.3 218(10) TFEU and the withdrawal 
agreement 
From these two cases the aim behind 218(10) TFEU becomes clearer. The 
information requirement is there so that the Parliament can exercise its 
democratic control over the Union’s external relations. Particularly, so that 
the Parliament can verify that the choice of legal basis was made with due 
regard to the powers of the Parliament. This requirement applies to the 
Union’s agreements in any policy field even though its exclusively relates to 
the CFSP and, therefore, the Parliament does not need to be consulted or give 
its consent for the conclusion of the agreement.203 The CJEU considers that 
the rule is an expression of one the founding principles of the Union; that the 
people should participate in the decision-making through a representative 
assembly. 204 The CJEU also found that the infringement of the information 
requirement must be seen as an infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement according and therefore can lead to the annulment of the 
measure.  
 
Given that the CJEU has stated that there is no restriction of the information 
requirement to certain Union policy fields, indicates that it should apply on 
the procedure for concluding the withdrawal agreement also. The rule gives 
the Parliament the possibility to take part in the decision-making in the 
Union’s external relation. The Parliament’s involvement in the Union’s 
decision-making is an expression of the principle of representative 
democracy. It would, therefore, be contradictory to this principle if the 
Parliament was not informed of ongoing procedure for concluding the 
withdrawal agreement. Also, in contrast to the two cases where the Parliament 
does need not to be consulted or give its consent, the Parliament needs to give 
its consent the withdrawal agreement according to Article 50(2) TEU. In 
order for the Parliament to be able to conduct a genuine democratic control 
over the negotiation process it needs to be informed of all stages. If the 
Parliament can only either give its consent to or reject the substance of a 
proposed agreement it cannot publicly deliberate on the agreement. To 
publicly deliberate, could be argued, is one of the fundamental tasks of the 
Parliament.205 In conclusion, by looking at the purposes behind the 
information requirement in Article 218(10) TFEU there are convincing 
arguments for this requirement to be applicable also on the procedure for 
concluding the withdrawal agreement.  
 
The next question is what this requirement entails in the context of the 
procedure for concluding the withdrawal agreement. In C-263/14 the CJEU 
gave some concrete meaning to when in the procedure and what kind of 
information must be transmitted to the Parliament. In addition to informing 
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of the formal steps on deciding on initiating the procedure and of the decision 
to conclude the withdrawal agreement. The Council is probably required to 
inform the Parliament of intermediate results as draft agreements and the draft 
Council’s decision reached by the working parties in the Council. 
 
The Parliament’s access to information during the procedure for conclusion 
of the agreement is vital for its ability to influence the direction and content 
of the withdrawal agreement. Article 218(10) TFEU could provide an 
important legal argument for the Parliament to put pressure on the Council to 
share information to the Parliament on the ongoing procedure for concluding 
a withdrawal agreement. With the framework agreement, discussed in 
subchapter 2.5, that is concluded with the Commission 218(10) TFEU 
provides a possibility to access to information from not only the Commission 
but also the Council. 
 
6.4 218(11) TFEU 
A Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission 
may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement 
envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. Where the opinion of the Court is 
adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it is 
amended or the Treaties are revised. 
 
The possibility for the Parliament to request an opinion from the CJEU on the 
envisaged withdrawal agreement creates further incitement for the Council 
and Commission to take the Parliament’s standpoints into consideration. If 
the Parliament raises any hesitations on the envisaged agreement’s 
compatibility with the Treaties and it refers, or threatens to refer, the 
agreement to the CJEU against the other institutions or Member States’ will. 
Beside that the Council and Commission might not agree on legal issue at 
hand and do not want to risk, for them, an unwanted decision by the CJEU 
the process can also be delayed. Even though the reference to the CJEU does 
not suspend the process. 218(11) TFEU does not have a suspensory effect on 
the process of negotiating and concluding the international agreements 
because it is still possible for the Union institutions and Member States to 
bring an annulment procedure after the international agreement has been 
concluded.206 It is not obvious that the time-limit on 2 years in 50(3) TEU 
would be pushed forward, as Eeckhout and Frantziou argues207, thereby 
risking the Treaties ceasing to apply automatically if it is not concluded before 
the CJEU gives its opinion. It is, therefore, relevant to discuss the possibility 
for the Parliament to ask the CJEU for an opinion because it could have real 
practical consequences on the outcome of the negotiations.  
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The primary legal arguments for that the general framework for concluding 
international agreements in 218 TFEU does not apply has been discussed in 
6.1. I will not repeat these arguments here.  
 
The need for a pre-judicial review of the Union’s international agreement is 
to avoid the easily imagined difficulties that could arise if the agreement was 
deemed to be unlawful after its conclusion. The Union would still be bound 
under international law if the strict conditions under the Vienna Convention 
Article 46 were not fulfilled.208 This would lead to a situation where the Union 
must rely on the contradicting parties good will in re-negotiating the 
agreement or to terminate it. This is also the foundation in the CJEU’s 
reasoning on the purpose behind the possibility for asking it for an opinion.   
 
In Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, the CJEU 
discussed the purpose behind the possibility to ask for an opinion. It stated 
that agreements’ compatibility with the Treaties 'must be assessed in the light 
of all the rules of the Treaty, that is to say, both those rules which determine 
the extent of the powers of the institutions of the community and substantive 
rules'. The CJEU thereby established that a request for an opinion could also 
include the issue of whether the Union has the competence to conclude the 
agreement. The CJEU meant this was necessary, if the agreement was found 
not to be compatible with the treaties, to prevent the  
 
[…]in a Community Context but also in that of international relations, serious 
difficulties and might give rise to adverse consequences for all interested 
parties, including third countries. To avoid such complications the CJEU 
stated that the ’Treaty had recourse to the exceptional procedure of a prior 
reference to Court of Justice for the purpose of elucidating, before the 
conclusion of the agreement, whether the latter is compatible with the 
Treaties.
209
 
 
Article 218(11) TFEU gives the Parliament a possibility to get an opinion 
from the CJEU before the EU can conclude an international agreement. The 
court can only give an opinion on an envisaged treaty, not one that has have 
already entered in to force.210 In Opinion 2/94 on accession to the ECHR, the 
CJEU stated that in order for it to be able to give an opinion, as minimum the 
purpose of the envisaged agreement must be known.211 The CJEU did not 
however consider it to be necessary that the Council had taken a decision212 
as long it had sufficient information on the specific arrangement. In this 
particular case, the CJEU did not consider it to have sufficient information on 
the proposed mechanism for judicial control under ECHR and could not, 
therefore, give its opinion on that issue.213 
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The withdrawal agreement under Article 50 TEU as discussed in subchapter 
2.1 would be binding under international law and the complications that could 
arise if the CJEU annulled the agreement after its conclusions or other 
complications due agreement’s incompatibility with the Treaties could 
potentially be grave. In line with the provision purpose as stated in Opinion 
1/75 it would be reasonable to argue that the possibility to ask the CJEU for 
an opinion would apply also in context of the withdrawal agreement.   
 
As discussed, primarily in chapter 5, the limitations of the scope of the 
withdrawal agreement and also the possibility of the withdrawal agreement 
being mixed, is unclear. There could therefore realistically be a need to get an 
opinion on these matters and others before conclusion of the withdrawal 
agreement. It would, therefore, arguable be contradictory to the rationale 
behind the provision to exclude its applicability in the procedure for 
concluding the withdrawal agreement.  
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Conclusions and analysis 
In this last chapter, the conclusions of thesis will first be summarised. These 
conclusions will then be further analysed. The discussion will lay out which 
minimum level of involvement by the Parliament is needed for the conclusion 
of the withdrawal agreement. Through the multi-level governance 
perspective, the Parliament must be seen as an independent actor, separated 
from the Member States, with its own possible agenda for the content of the 
withdrawal agreement. It is, therefore, interesting to discuss the possibilities 
for Parliament to influence the negotiations and content of an anticipated 
withdrawal agreement.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4 and 6.2, according to Article 50 TEU and Article 
218(3) TFEU, the Parliament does not formally take part in formulating the 
EC’s guidelines for the negotiations. The Parliament does not either, 
formally, have a say in the authorising of the opening of the negotiations and 
appointing the Union’s negotiator. The Parliament does not either have a 
formal say in formulating the negotiation directives according to Article 
218(4) TFEU. The Parliament’s formal participation in the procedure is to 
give or not give its consent to the withdrawal agreement according to Article 
50(3) TFEU.  
 
The fact that the Parliament must give its consent provides it a form of veto-
power. As showed in subchapter 2.4 the Parliament has used this veto-power 
before to increase its role in the negotiation process or alter the content of the 
international agreement. The Parliament has also, in the context of the 
expected negotiations between the Union and UK, adopted a resolution (see 
subchapter 6.2.1) where it states that it will not give its consent to a 
withdrawal agreement if it has not been fully involved in the negotiation 
process. The Parliament’s resolution was adopted on the 5th of April 2017, 
one week after UK’s notification of its intention to withdraw from the Union 
and a little more than three weeks before the EC’s adopted its guidelines.214 
As already mentioned, the resolution explicitly demands that the Parliament 
must be allowed to be involved in the negotiations as well, or it will not give 
its to consent to any agreement.215 The Parliament clearly shows it intention 
to take an active role in the negotiations for a withdrawal agreement.  
 
A crucial factor in order for the Parliament to be able to influence the outcome 
of the negotiations, is access to information. With information on the 
development of the negotiations it is possible for the Parliament to formulate 
reasoned standpoints. To be informed at an early stage of the negotiations is 
also important in order to influence the general direction of the agreement. It 
is, arguably, easier to influence the content of an agreement while it is being 
developed than demanding fundamental alterations to a draft agreement 
which has taken months to negotiate. The two year time-limit in 50(3) TEU 
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before the Treaties cease to apply could also pressure the Parliament to give 
its consent to a withdrawal agreement it, given other circumstances, would 
not give its consent to.  Without speculating too much on how the political 
context may be when the Parliament eventually is asked to give its consent, it 
is easy to foresee that it would probably be politically difficult not to give its 
consent to the suggested withdrawal agreement. In conclusion, if the 
Parliament would want to influence the content of the withdrawal agreement 
with the UK, it is important to play an active role from the start.  
 
In addition to using its veto-power to argue for its right to be involved in 
negotiations, the Parliament could also argue in favour of the applicability of 
the general framework of concluding international agreements in Article 218 
TFEU on the procedure for concluding the withdrawal agreement. As shown 
in chapter 6, there are credible legal arguments that the general procedure in 
218 TFEU for concluding international agreement should apply on procedure 
for concluding the withdrawal agreement as well. The procedure in 218 TFEU 
prescribes different roles for the Union’s Institutions in the procedure of 
concluding international agreements. These roles must be respected by the 
other Institutions according to the principle of institutional balance. The 
general framework in Article 218 TFEU provides the Parliament the right to 
be immediately fully informed at all stages of the procedure, 218(10) TFEU, 
and the possibility to ask the CJEU for an Opinion on the envisaged 
agreements compatibility with the Treaties, 218(11) TFEU. A contextual 
interpretation supports the applicability of the general framework in Article 
218 TFEU on the withdrawal process. Article 218(3) TFEU its need to be 
applied together with its framework in Article 218 TFEU.216 For instance the 
possibility to assign directives to the negotiator according to 218(4) TFEU is 
arguably needed for such a complicated agreement which most, likely will 
have, significant effects for the Union and the Member States. This clearly 
indicates the need to apply the general framework in 218 TFEU on the 
withdrawal procedure.  
 
In addition, as discussed in subchapters 6.3 and 6.4, the purposes behind 
Articles 218(10) and 218(11) TFEU are highly relevant in the context of the 
procedure for concluding the withdrawal agreement. The Parliament needs to 
be fully informed at all stages of the procedure to be able to deliberate on the 
envisaged agreement. Not informing the Parliament at all stages of the 
negotiations could contradict the principle that people should take participate 
in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly; the principle that Article 218(10) TFEU is based on, according to 
the CJEU. It would be contradictory to the rationale behind 218(11) TFEU if 
the Parliament would not have the possibility to ask for an Opinion from the 
CJEU on the envisaged agreement’s compatibility with the Treaties. If the 
withdrawal agreement in some aspects would breach the Treaties; the 
complications could further down the line be dire. The CJEU might have to 
deal with such complications in an annulment proceeding according to 263 
TFEU or after requests for preliminary rulings pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.  
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The fact that Article 50 TEU contains unclear and vague formulations makes 
it possible for the Parliament to argue that it should have an influential role in 
the negotiations. In line with Rittberger’s writing, the incomplete nature of 
Treaty provisions open up for bargaining between the Union’s Institutions. 
The Parliament could argue that because of the principle of representative 
democracy, and to battle the notion of a democratic deficit in the Union’s 
decision making, the Parliament should have a central role in the procedure 
for negotiating the withdrawal agreement.217 This enables the Parliament to 
argue for a favourable interpretation of its role under Article 218 TFEU and 
also for the application of the Framework agreement discussed in subchapter 
2.4. As discussed in Chapter 5, the possible scope of the withdrawal 
agreement under Article 50 is unclear. The Commission argue that Article 50 
TEU gives it an exceptional horizontal competence when it comes to 
negotiate and conclude a withdrawal agreement. In light of this, the 
Parliament could argue that as the representative of the Union’s people it is 
crucial that the Parliament receives information on the progress of the 
negotiations so it can publicly debate the agreement and protect the people’s 
interest. Especially given the background, that the withdrawal agreement will 
probably not be concluded as a mixed agreement and therefore the 
participation of the national parliaments will be excluded. As Rittberger 
writes, the shift of power to Member State’s executives due to the Union-
integration creates pressure to enhance the elements of representative 
democracy at the European level.218  The criticism from the Brexit-campaign 
in the UK that the decision-making in the Union is undemocratic might also 
make it harder, politically, to ignore the Parliament’s requests for 
involvement.219  
 
According to the multi-level governance theory it is also to expect that sub-
national actors will try to form relations with interest groups in the 
Parliament.220 This kind of lobbying might also pressure the Parliament to 
play an active role in the procedure of concluding the withdrawal agreement.  
 
It is today unknown how the UK’s expected withdrawal from the Union will 
turn out. Which role the Parliament will have is also too early to say. This 
thesis has though, hopefully, shown that the Parliament could potentially play 
a fundamental role in procedure for concluding a withdrawal agreement under 
Article 50 TEU.   
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